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This dissertation is a set of three independent essays on empirical development
economics, with a focus on China. The first chapter examines the effect of ma-
ternal education on infant health by exploiting exogenous variation in women’s
exposure to the wholesale closure of rural high schools immediately after the
Cultural Revolution, from 1977 to 1984. The second chapter explores the long-
term effect of prenatal exposure to the 1978-84 land reform on academic perfor-
mance, as captured by college entrance exam scores. The third chapter examines
the effect of land reform on the sex ratio imbalance by comparing the sex of the
second child between families with a first girl and those with a first boy before
and after the reform.
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CHAPTER 1
MOTHER’S EDUCATION AND INFANT HEALTH: EVIDENCE FROM
CLOSURE OF HIGH SCHOOLS IN CHINA
1.1 Introduction
Maternal education could affect infant health by increasing household income
or directly improving health behaviors. A better educated woman earns more
in the labor market and is also more likely to marry a man with more schooling
and higher earnings. An increased household incomewould enable a woman to
have better access to health care services and spend more on health inputs, es-
pecially during pregnancy. Because better educated women may acquire more
health information or process it better, they may use health inputs more effi-
ciently or have better allocations of these inputs (Grossman, 1972; 2006). More
educated women are also more likely to avoid risky behaviors. For example, an
additional year of schooling induced by college openings was found to decrease
maternal smoking by over 30 percent (Currie and Moretti, 2003).
The robust positive association betweenmaternal education and child health
has been widely documented (e.g., Strauss and Thomas, 1995; Gakidou at al.,
2010) and has motivated policy-makers to promote female education in devel-
oping countries (World Bank, 1993). Such education policies will be effective in
improving infant health to the extent that maternal education has a causal effect
on child health, which has been debatable due to possibly omitted variables,
such as a woman’s predetermined socioeconomic status. Studies that exploit
various school expansion programs as exogenous sources of a decline in the
costs of schooling find a positive effect of maternal education on infant health
1
in the US, Indonesia and Taiwan (Currie andMoretti, 2003; Breierova and Duflo,
2004; Chou et al. 2010). In contrast, Lindeboom et al. (2009) using changes in
British compulsory schooling laws do not find an effect, and McCray and Royer
(2011) comparing women born just before and just after the school entry date
in the US also show no effect of maternal education on infant health. Thus, the
design-based literature offers mixed findings.1 A missing part of this literature
is that, little is known about whether education interventions targeting higher
levels of schooling in developing countries, e.g., high school, could improve
infant health.2
In this paper, I provide new evidence on the effect of maternal education on
infant health by exploiting the largest negative supply-side shock in history: the
nationwide closures of rural high schools in post-Mao China, which induced a
sharp increase in the costs of high school education for the rural population.
Immediately after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, an education reform was
initiated in 1977 to close rural secondary schools built during the Cultural Revo-
lution, with the most acute reductions occurring in high schools (Pepper, 1996).
With an official justification of better serving the economic reform, the education
reform completely reverted the priorities of the Cultural Revolution to concen-
trate education resources on selected urban schools. Figure 1 shows that the
total number of high schools decreased by more than 80 percent between 1977
and 1983; the decline was larger for rural high schools, the target of the closure
movement. A distinct feature of these closures is that they were not driven by
the change in the overall demand for high schools. Figure 2 shows that both
overall population and rural population aged 15-18 had been increasing from
1These studies use different education interventions or policies targeting at different margins
of schooling, and the subpopulation affected by each intervention is different.
2In the 2000 Census of China, for example, only 8 percent of the rural population had ever
completed high school.
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1977 to 1983.
The identification strategy focuses comparisons on rural women born quar-
ters apart but who had different exposures to the closures of high schools within
county. The variation in women’s exposure status across narrowly defined co-
horts comes from two sources. First, when the closures of high schools started
in a given county, individuals aged 18 who had just graduated from high school
were relatively unexposed, while those aged 17weremore exposed to the shock.
The second source of variation is generated by the school entry date policy.
From 1967 to the late 1970s, one should be 7 years old at the beginning of the
spring semester, usually in February or March, to start primary school. Individ-
uals born in the first quarter went to schools one year earlier and thus gradu-
ated one year earlier, which would allow them to avoid the closures, compared
to those born in the second quarter of the same year. Consequently, a sharp
decline in high school completion is expected for individuals at age 17 years
and 9 months (age 17.75 hereafter) by the first quarter in the first year of the
closures. Assuming women born quarters apart are otherwise similar, I can
compare high school completion and infant health between women just above
and just below age 17.75 within county. The relationship between maternal ed-
ucation and infant health is assessed by relating the differences in infant health
to the differences in high school completion induced by the closures.
To perform these comparisons, I have collected unique data on the year the
closures of rural high schools started by county from two-thirds of all county
gazetteers ever published in which local history was recorded from 1949 to the
1980s. While the central decision to close rural high schools applied to every
county, the timing of the closures varied by county from 1977 to 1984. These
3
data are combined with the 1992 Chinese Children Survey microdata, a national
representative survey that covers a wide range of infant health outcomes and
parental characteristics. The analysis sample includes 400 counties that were
rural at the time of the closures and that are matched in both of these data. The
matched data allowme to assign the exposure status to each rural woman by her
age in the first quarter of the first year of the school closures, and then examine
the effects of her exposure to the closures on educational attainment and infant
health.
There are four main reasons the identification strategy provides credible ev-
idence on the causal effect of maternal education on infant health. First, the
identifying assumption on the similarity of women on either side of age 17.75
within county is plausible because their parents were unlikely to strategically
plan births to avoid the shock. The closure decision was made shortly after the
end of Mao’s era and was unpredictable in more than ten years ago. Moreover,
the school entry date was changed from September 1st to the spring semester
in 1967, before which year women around 17 at the time of the closures had
been born. Due to this policy change, women born in the first quarter are not
more planned than those born in the second quarter.3 Second, this assumption
is also testable by examining the continuity of predetermined familial charac-
teristics. I provide evidence that these women and their parents on either side
of the age cutoff are similar along many predetermined dimensions. Third, to
confound the effects of the high school closures, other post-Mao reforms should
have closely followed the timing of the school closures by county and have had
differential impacts on women just older and just younger than 17.75 in the first
quarter of the reform year. I provide evidence to rule out two possibly alterna-
3The criticism on An grist and Kruger (1991) regarding seasonality of birth (Bound et al.,
1995) is less of a concern in this study. Also, quarter of birth fixed effects are controlled for.
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tive hypotheses: the 1978-84 land reform and closures of rural middle schools
after the Cultural Revolution. Finally, internal migration had been under strict
control in China from the 1950s until the first relaxation in 1985 (Wang, 2005). A
natural concern about endogenous mobility induced by policy changes is less
important for the school closures between 1977 and 1984.
Consistent with expectations for educational attainment, the results show a
sharp drop in high school completion for women at age 17.75 in the first quarter
of the first year of the school closures. The decline of 2.7 percentage points from
12 percent at age 18 suggests that, 22.5 percent of women on the margin were
affected by the negative shock. Estimates are precise, indicating a strong first
stage. Similar to McCray and Royer (2011), I find negligible effect of a woman’s
exposure to the closures on her selection into motherhood and maternal age at
first birth, reducing concerns about endogenous sample selection. Using the
discontinuous change in high school completion induced by the closures, I do
not find strong evidence that one more year of maternal high school education
improves infant health, as measured by prematurity, low birthweight, neonatal
mortality and infant mortality. Lastly, I examine the income channel, as cap-
tured by labor market outcomes and associative mating in the marriage market,
and potential changes in health behavior, measured by prenatal care. I find no
evidence to support both channels.
Interpreting my findings requires considerations of the research design in
this paper. First, the estimated effects are specific to a subpopulation of women
affected by the high school closures. When local rural schools were closed, par-
ents could send their children to urban schools in the same county to continue
schooling. Because the closures of rural schools increased the costs of complet-
5
ing high school, my estimates are most relevant to women from low socioe-
conomic background who were more likely to comply with the closures. Sec-
ond, in the narrow comparisons among women on either side of age 17.75, the
margin of maternal education affected by the closures is one more year in high
school, which accounts for half of the high school education at that time,4 and a
high school diploma.
The principle contribution of this paper is in its ability to uniquely isolate the
effect of maternal high school education on infant health by exploiting the un-
expected and massive school closures in rural China. While the existing quasi-
experimental studies in developing countries focus on interventions targeting
lower levels of schooling (Breierova and Duflo, 2004; Chou et al., 2010), this
study is among the first to identify the effect of maternal education at the higher
end of the education distribution.
Moreover, the identification strategy, as well as the particular context in
China, allow me to separate possible mechanisms through which maternal ed-
ucation could affect infant health, which in turn casts doubt on two arguments
in this literature. The first argument is that maternal education improves infant
health through women’s learning in school. However, it is very difficult to dis-
entangle the effect of learning from staying in school longer and thus less likely
to be pregnant under age 18, which could also improve infant health (Royer,
2004). Primary school or middle school opening programs could be different
from interventions at the exit of high school in terms of separating these two
channels. For example, in Breierova and Duflo (2004), women’s exposure to
the primary school construction program reduced the number of children born
before age 15. It is unclear whether the improvement in infant health is due
4The years of schooling in high school had been 2 years from the 1960s until 1983.
6
to women’s actual learning or the endogenous reduction in teenage pregnancy.
In contrast, in this paper using closures of high schools, women on the margin
were very close to 18. I therefore do not expect an effect on teenage pregnancy,
and indeed, I do not find an effect.
The second argument is that maternal education could directly improve
health behavior (Grossman, 1972). Empirically, it is also not easy to separate
direct change in health behavior from income change, as they are often closely
related. Using microdata from a 1992 survey, when China was still under the
transition from a planned economy to a market oriented economy, I would ex-
pect that the income channel is very weak. My findings on labor market out-
comes are consistent with previous studies that find zero or even negative earn-
ings returns to education in the same period (Gregory and Meng, 1995; Li and
Hang, 1998). This is a unique setting where separating these two channels be-
comes possible. If one more year in high school could improve maternal health
behavior, even without an income channel, we would still expect a positive ef-
fect on infant health. However, we do not.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the back-
ground of the closures of rural high schools in China and discusses the assign-
ment of treatment status. Section 3 describes the county-level data on the timing
of the closures and the microdata on mothers and children. Section 4 presents
the identification strategy. Section 5 presents results by outcomes of interests.
Robustness checks are presented in Section 6. The last section concludes.
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1.2 The Closures of Rural High Schools
First introduced in this section are the closures of rural high schools right after
the Cultural Revolution from the late 1970s through the early 1980s. I then dis-
cuss key institutional information for determining one’s exposure status to the
school closures within county, which directly guides the identification strategy
in this study. Lastly, using data I collected on the timing of the school closures
by county and county characteristics prior to the shock, I provide quantitative
evidence for understanding the regional variation in the timing of the closures.
1.2.1 Historical accounts on the closures of rural high schools
In May 1966, Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution, a decade-long so-
cial movement that brought a radical agenda to politics and education policies.
An essential goal of the Cultural Revolution was to eliminate differences be-
tween peasants and the remainder of the population (Deng and Treiman, 1997).
The revolution in the education system was to deliberately destroy the old
“elite education system” and construct a new “mass education system” (Pep-
per, 1996). Colleges were closed from 1966 to 1972 and college entrance exam-
inations were eliminated for an entire decade. No formal teaching was carried
out and all levels of schools stopped recruiting new students in cities from 1966
to 1968 (Meng and Gregory, 2002). Education policy priorities shifted to peasant
youth by popularizing middle schools and expanding high schools in the coun-
tryside.5 To speed up the expansion at a lower cost, junior high classrooms were
attached to primary schools and senior high classrooms were added to middle
5See Andreas (2004), Han (2001), Pepper (1996) and Thogersen (2002) for details of the school
expansion in rural areas during the Cultural Revolution.
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schools in rural communes, which enabled rural children to go to secondary
schools within walking distance (Han, 2001; Thogersen, 2002). In the rural pop-
ulation, the middle school enrollment rate increased from 34 percent in 1965 to
75 percent in 1976 and the high school enrollment rate rose from 9 percent to 62
percent (Ministry of Education, 1984).
Soon after Mao’s death in September of 1976, the post-Mao shift in ideology
in the Chinese Communist Party led to a complete reversal of education policies
during the Cultural Revolution (Pepper, 1996). An education reform to recon-
struct the education system was proposed by Deng Xiaoping in 1977 (Ministry
of Education, 1984). Immediately, a college entrance examination was reintro-
duced at the end of that year. Education priorities were changed from expand-
ing secondary education in the countryside to developing a few urban-based
and quality-oriented secondary schools in urban areas, which concentrated the
best teachers and resources for training the most talented students (Ministry of
Education, 1984).
The decision to close rural secondary schools built during the Cultural Rev-
olution was made by the central government (Pepper, 1996). The cutbacks were
most severe at the high school level, for which the national enrollment rates in
1981-1982 were down by two thirds from those in 1978.6 The official justification
of closing rural high schools was that, to best serve economic development, high
schools should be college preparatory, and because only a small proportion of
students were able to enter college, it was unnecessary to keep a large enroll-
ment rate in high schools, particularly in rural areas where students hardly had
a chance to compete (Pepper, 1990).7 Urban teachers who were sent to teach
6Ganging Daily, Oct. 12th, 1981.
7In Lia Hui county in Hebe province, education officials also argued that “The commune
high schools were eliminated to concentrate forces to run one good “keypoint” school in the
9
in rural high schools during the Cultural Revolution and the send-down urban
youth returned to cities after 1976, which also accelerated the closures of rural
schools (Pepper, 1996).8 At the local level, from 1977 to the early 1980s, county
governments gradually started to close rural high schools, and the closures usu-
ally continued for two or three years, until only one or a few high schools were
kept in the urban area of every county.9
A natural concern is related to education quality of these rural schools built
during the Cultural Revolution. Compared to education in other time periods,
the regular curricula in high schools during the Cultural Revolution were short-
ened and political education was given a higher weight. On the other hand,
urban teachers were sent to teach in rural schools, and some of the urban send-
down youth also taught in rural schools. They might provide better teaching
quality than rural teachers. Moreover, Andreas (2004) argues that, while “bet-
ter quality” in education reform referred to a higher promotion rate from high
schools to colleges, rural high schools built during the Cultural Revolution were
to develop practical curricula that were more relevant for employment and in-
come growth in the countryside. Whether there is an improvement in education
quality after the Cultural Revolution is also not clear. In Li et al (2005) using a
twins sample in cities in 2005, they find zero earnings return to high school edu-
cation alone, while there is sizable positive return to college education. Overall,
the concern about changes in education quality in high school remains an em-
pirical question and requires data on individual earnings to test.
county town. We set our sights on the college examinations and took the best teachers to the
only one high school. The aimwas to producemost talented students who could pass the college
examinations” (Andreas, 2004).
8The “send-down” movement during the Cultural Revolution resulted in one out of every
three urban adolescents (most aged 16–19), approximately 17 million youths, being sent to the
countryside for manual labor for from 1 or 2 to as many as 10 years during the period 1966-76
(Li et al., 2010).
9The chapter on secondary education from various issues of county gazetteers.
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1.2.2 Determining one’s exposure status within county
one’s exposure to the closures of high schools depends on one’s year of birth,
quarter of birth and the first year of the closures in the county of birth. Three
pieces of institutional information are crucial to assign one’s exposure status
within county.
First, whowere affected by the closures of rural high schools? Little is known
about individual exposure to the shock from existing studies on this particular
event (Pepper, 1996; Andreas, 2004). To answer this question, I conducted inter-
views with local teachers who taught in high schools in the late 1970s in three
counties of Shaun province. All of the interviewees recalled that when rural
high schools were closed, most students simply dropped out, even though they
were allowed to continue in the few urban high schools in town. Teacher Lou
said,
At the beginning, the high school in town became very crowded
as students from rural communes came in, but many of them dis-
appeared after a month or two. They stopped coming because the
travel and boarding costs were too high for rural families and stu-
dents had to walk for two or three hours to school. While it was the
proximity of high schools in local communes that made rural chil-
dren able to go during the Cultural Revolution, the only high school
in town was not a real alternative for most students living in rural
areas.
The important message is that individuals who just graduated from high school
by the first year of the closures were able to avoid the shock, yet the students in
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their final year of high school were the oldest affected.
To determine the age of the oldest cohorts exposed to the school closures,
the second piece of information is age at graduation from high school from the
late 1970s to the early 1980s. The minimum entry age of primary schools was
set at 7 in 1951.10 From the mid 1960s to 1982, students spent five or six years
in primary schools, two or three years in middle schools and two years in high
schools.11 The years of schooling in primary schools or middle schools could
vary across counties, or even vary across schools within the same county be-
cause some schools were chosen to implement trials that involved shortened
years of schooling.12 Therefore, age at graduation from high school was not
universal and varied from 16 to 18 at the time of the closures. Although the ex-
act number of years in schools is not observed either at the county level or at the
individual level, I can compare individuals at 18 in the first year of the closures
who mostly had graduated with those at 17 who were the oldest ones at risk of
dropout when the negative shock arrived.
Lastly, the school entry date policy enables me to narrow down these com-
parisons among individuals born quarters apart. The school entry date was in
the spring semester, usually in February or March, from 1967 to the late 1970s.13
Individuals born in the first quarter were more likely to go to school one year
earlier and thus graduate one year earlier, compared to those born in the other
three quarters of the same year. Because graduation was in January, no matter
in which month the first few schools were closed, those at 18 by the first quar-
ter in the first year of the closures would mostly have graduated, while those
10China Education Yearbook: 1949-1981.
11China Education Yearbook: 1949-1981.
12Major Educational Events in People’s Republic of China: 1949-1982.
13Major Educational Events in People’s Republic of China: Primary Education; Major Educational
Events in People’s Republic of China: Secondary Education.
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born in the other three quarters of the same year were still likely to be in the
final year and at risk of dropout. Thus, the finest comparisons are essentially
among individuals born in the first and second quarter of the same year in the
same county. A common concern is that parents might strategically plan births
to ensure an earlier school entry date of their children. It is unlikely in this set-
ting because the school entry date changed from September 1st to the spring
semester in 1967, and individuals around 17 from the late 1970s to the early
1980s were born before this policy change.
Putting it all together, within county, the oldest cohort exposed to the clo-
sures of high schools were 17 years and 9 months in the first quarter of the first
year of the closures. For example, in counties that closed schools in 1979, indi-
viduals born in the first quarter of 1961 were 18 and had just graduated by the
first quarter of 1979, while those born in the second quarter of the same year
were 17.75 and were the oldest affected.
1.3 Data
Two core datasets are used in this study. One is unique data on the timing of
the school closures by county that I collected from county gazetteers. The other
is the 1992 Chinese Children Survey conducted by the State Statistics Bureau of
China and UNICEF, a nationally representative microdata on child health and
parental characteristics.
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1.3.1 County-level data on the timing of the closures
The timing of the closures of rural high schools is recorded on county gazetteers.
Following a thousand-year long tradition of recording local history, the most re-
cent collection of county gazetteers that compile county records from 1949 to the
1980s have been published since 1985 (Vermeer, 1992). County gazetteers docu-
ment local events and statistics about geography, politics, economy and culture,
which are originally from official archives and policy documents of county gov-
ernments (Xue, 2010). In the chapter on education, records are very rough for
the ten years of the Cultural Revolution, which keeps me from exploring the
expansion of rural schools. In contrast, records in the post-Mao period are more
available and detailed, which are valuable for studying the closures of rural
high schools.14
I have collected the year each county started to close rural high schools from
1247 county gazetteers, which represent 68 percent of all county gazetteers ever
published in the recent collection. The other 32 percent do not report the year
of closure, or some of them report “the late 1970s” or “the early 1980s”, which
are not useful for the identification strategy. I plot the percentage of counties
that started to close rural high schools from 1977 to 1984 by the solid line in
Figure 3. While a very small proportion of counties closed schools as early as
1977 or after 1981, the vast majority of county governments made the closure
decisions between 1978 and 1981. More than half of the counties had closed
rural high schools by 1979 and over 96 percent had closed by 1981. There are
400 rural counties in 27 provinces matched by using these county-level data
with the 1992 Chinese Children Survey microdata. To define a rural sample, I
14These records are also more reliable because they are not under the restriction of “be rough,
not in detail” that is placed on recording politically sensitive periods.
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use the administrative code in the 1982 Census to exclude cities and districts in
1982, which is closest to the time of the closures.15 The dashed line in Figure 3
shows that these matched counties are representative of all counties collected in
the distribution of the timing.
1.3.2 1992 Chinese Children Survey
The 1992 Chinese Children Survey (the 1992 CCS hereafter) covers 522,371
households from 1088 counties in 29 provinces. Although information from
both parents is available, this study focuses on mothers for two reasons. First,
the mother’s education has been found to have a larger effect on infant health
than the father’s (Chou et al., 2010). Second, the data quality for women is
much better than that for men in the 1992 CCS.16 In my analysis sample of
women, more than 97 percent were married, but only 70 percent of them could
be matched to their husbands by unique personal id.
For every individual, the highest level of completed education is reported,
while years of schooling are not observed. As discussed in Section 2, years of
schooling in primary schools and middle schools varied in the 1960s and 1970s.
It is therefore not possible to construct a consistent measure on one’s years of
schooling from the reported education level. I measure maternal education by
high school completion, the margin directly affected by the closures of high
schools and that I can precisely measure for the whole sample. Notably, the
years of schooling in high school had been 2 years from the 1960s until 1983
15An administrative unit is defined as a county if the last two digits of the county code in 1982
is between 21 and 80 (definition of the State Bureau of Statistics).
16More than 80 percent of the survey forms were answered by women.
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when it was changed to 3 years.17 In the narrow comparisons among individu-
als on either side of 17.75 in the first quarter between 1978 and 1981, their years
of schooling in high school did not change due to the 1983 policy change.
In the 1992 CCS, every woman who had ever been pregnant since 1976 re-
ported a complete pregnancy history for every birth and detailed birth out-
comes (yet not restricted to births after 1976). I use four measures of poor infant
health that are commonly studied in the related literature. The first one is the in-
cidence of prematurity because premature infants are at higher risk of death in
the first year, especially in the first month. Because gestational age is reported in
completed months, I define prematurity as gestational age less than 9 months.
I also examine neonatal mortality and infant mortality rates. The last measure
is low birthweight, which is widely used to measure poor infant health and is
linked to later life consequences.18 If low birthweight is affected by maternal
education, we would expect long-term intergenerational effects as well. The
limitation of the last measure is that only 36 percent of mothers reported the
birth weight of their first birth (in grams). Low birthweight is defined as less
than 2500 grams in this subsample.
Because one’s county of birth is not observed in the 1992 CCS, I match the
microdata with the county-level data on the timing of the school closures by
using a woman’s county of residence in 1992. One might be concerned that a
woman’s county of birth might not be her county of residence in 1992 if she
migrated. The concern is less important because internal migration had been
under strong restrictions by the early 1990s.19 In the 1990 Census, the migration
rate among rural women in the birth cohorts of my analysis sample is as low as
17Major Educational Events in People’s Republic of China: Secondary Education.
18See Almond et al. (2005) for a review on this literature.
19See a detailed discussion on internal migration in China in Section 4.2.
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5 percent .
In the sample of 400 matched counties, a woman’s exposure status is as-
signed by her year of birth, quarter of birth and the timing of the school clo-
sures. The analysis sample includes rural women at 12-23 by the first quarter in
the first year of the closures, who were 24 quarters above 17.75 and 24 quarters
below. They were born between 1953 and 1970 and at 22-39 in 1992. Among
all women in the sample, 92 percent of them had ever been pregnant since 1976
and are therefore in the sample of mothers.
The sample of births for analyzing infant health includes the first births. My
findings are comparable with those in other quasi-experimental studies using
the sample of first Born’s (Currie and Moretti, 2003; McCray and Royer, 2011).
Few other restrictions are made on the sample of births except for a minor one.
Because some birth outcomes of nonsingleton births, for example, birth weight
and infant mortality rate, could be very different from those of singleton births,
I exclude nonsingleton births (1.41 percent).20
The summary statistics of women and mothers in the sample are presented
in Table 1, as well as tabulations for the first births and for all births. There are
7.3 percent of women who have completed high school and only 0.17 percent
have a college degree, suggesting that women with a high school education are
at the very high end of the education distribution among these cohorts. Com-
pared to all women in the sample, mothers are slightly less likely to complete
high school and to work off-farm. The marriage rates in both samples are very
high, which are 97 and 99.96 percent, respectively. Infant health measures of
first births do not differ much from those in the sample of all births. Compared
20I also find that having multiple births is unrelated to a woman’s exposure to the school
closures.
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to all births, the first births have slightly lower birth weight but are less likely to
experience neonatal or infant death. First-time mothers are slightly more likely
to have prenatal visits, especially in the first trimester, and to deliver their births
in hospital.
1.4 Empirical Framework
1.4.1 Identification strategy
Assuming a woman’s decision to become a mother is unaffected by her expo-
sure the school closures, the identification strategy exploits the fact that mothers
on either side of 17.75 by the first quarter of the year the school closures started
had different exposures to the closures within county. The first stage compares
high school completion of mothers and the reduced form examines infant health
of the first births. The difference in high school completion induced by the clo-
sures is related to differences in infant health outcomes to quantify the causal
effect of maternal education on infant health. The identifying assumption is that
mothers on either side of 17.75 within county are similar along all dimensions
except for their distinct exposures to the school closures.
To assign one’s exposure status, I first define one’s cohort as one’s age in
quarter by the first quarter in the first year of the closures in one’s county of
birth in equation (1):
agei = T j − y + 1 − q4 , (1.1)
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where i indexes individual, j county of birth, y year of birth and q quarter of
birth. T j indicates the first year of the school closures in one’s county of birth.
Recall that individuals at 17.75 were the oldest at risk of being exposed to the
closures of high schools, while those at 18 had just graduated and were able to
avoid the shock.
A discontinuous drop in high school completion is expected at 17.75. Con-
sider the first stage equation:
S i = α + β1{agei ≤ 17.75} + f (agei)γ + f (agei) ∗ 1{agei ≤ 17.75}δ
+θq + λ j + φ j ∗ [ f (agei) + f (agei) ∗ 1{agei ≤ 17.75}] + ￿i
(1.2)
where S i is equal to 1 if mother i born in county j, year y and quarter q
completed high school and is 0 otherwise. The indicator variable 1{agei ≤ 17.75}
is equal to 1 when the mother was at 17.75 or younger by the first quarter in the
first year of the closures in her county of birth and 0 otherwise. The analysis
sample includes Prue-exposure cohorts at 18-23 (as integers) and post-exposure
cohorts at 12-17. f (.) is a flexible polynomial function of agei. As suggested by
the national trend of school supply in Figure 1, the closures of high schools is
expected to induce both a decline in the mean level and a trend reversal of high
school completion at the individual level. Thus, all specifications include the
age polynomial function interacted with the indicator, 1{agei ≤ 17.75}, to allow
for a change in slope at 17.75. I include quarter of birth effect, θq, to account for
any seasonal differences. The coefficient of interest, β, captures the difference in
the probabilities of completing high school on either side of 17.75.
To perform cross-cohort comparisons within county, I control for county
fixed effects, λ j, and county specific quadratic trends, φ j ∗ [ f (agei) + f (agei) ∗
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1{agei ≤ 17.75}], which also allow for a change in the slope of each county spe-
cific trend at 17.75. By absorbing heterogeneity in time invariant county charac-
teristics and Prue-existing county trends, this approach is essentially comparing
women born in the first and second quarter of the same year but who had dif-
ferent exposures to the closures in the same county. Thus, the interpretation of
β is the average departure at 17.75 from county specific trends of high school
completion.
The reduced form on infant health is expressed in equation (3):
Yi = α + ρ1{agei ≤ 17.75} + f (agei)γ + f (agei) ∗ 1{agei ≤ 17.75}δ
+θq + λ j + φ j ∗ [ f (agei) + f (agei) ∗ 1{agei ≤ 17.75}] + ￿i
(1.3)
where Yi includes infant health measures of the first child of mother i. The
coefficient of interest, ρ, measures the effect of a mother’s exposure to the school
closures on infant health. If maternal education improves infant health, ρ is
expected to be positive for each of the four measures of poor infant health,
including prematurity, low birthweight, neonatal mortality and infant mortal-
ity. The effect of female high school education on infant health could be cap-
tured by dividing the reduced form estimate ρ by the first stage estimate β. I
also perform an instrumental variables estimation using the indicator variable,
1{agei ≤ 17.75}, as the instrument of high school completion, to directly measure
the effect of maternal education on infant health.
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1.4.2 Discussions on the identifying assumptions
Now let’s reconsider the first assumption on sample selection. It would be in-
valid if a woman’s decision to become a mother was affected by her exposure
to the closures of high schools. A common finding from quasi-experimental
studies on education and fertility is that women’s education affects their selec-
tion into motherhood (Black et al., 2008; Osili and Long, 2009; Duflo et al., 2011;
Ozier, 2011; etc.).21 Maternal age at first birth is another concern. Royer (2004)
finds that a Prue-term birth is more likely if a mother has her first child before 18
or after 35. The closures of high schools kept teenage girls out of schools, which
might have shifted a woman’s age at first birth to be under 18 and thus have had
negative effect on infant health. It would be difficult to differentiate the effect
on infant health of women not staying in schools in their teen years from that
of lower education levels and less knowledge learned in schools. Therefore, be-
fore proceeding to investigate educational attainment and infant health, I first
examine the reduced form effects of a woman’s exposure to the closures on her
motherhood choice and maternal age at first birth.
The second assumption in identifying the causal effect of maternal educa-
tion on infant health is that mothers on either side of age 17.75 are comparable,
except for their different exposures to the closures of high schools. This as-
sumption is plausible because both the closures of high schools and the change
in the school entry date policy were unexpected. It is unlikely that parents of
these women were able to precisely predict both of these changes and respond
21Black et al. (2008) find that female education reduces teenage childbearing in Norway and
the US. Duflo et al. (2011) also show that subsidizing girls’ education leads to a significant
reduction in teenage pregnancy in Kenya. Osili and Long (2009) present evidence that better
educated women have fewer births before age 25 in Nigeria. Ozier (2011) finds that secondary
school education reduces teenage pregnancy in Kenya.
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in planning births accordingly to avoid the closures. This assumption is also
testable by testing the continuity of observable and predetermined characteris-
tics between women just beyond 17.75 and those just below. I provide evidence
in Section 6.1 that these women and their parents are very similar.
Another concern about endogenous responses arises from the fact that the
timing of school closures varied across counties. In counties that closed schools
later, parents might have had expectations on the negative shock, and their chil-
dren might have had dropped out voluntarily before the county government
made the closure decision. If such responses had existed, we would expect a
decline in high school completion among cohorts older than 17.75 by the first
quarter of the first year of the closures. In Section 5.2, I plot women’s high
school completion by their age at the time of the school closures. I do not find
any sign of a decline among the Prue-exposure cohorts.
Moreover, there are two alternative hypotheses that might explain the dis-
continuous change in maternal education or infant health at 17.75. The first
hypothesis is related to concurrent reforms after the Cultural Revolution. For
other reforms to confound the effects of the school closures, they should have
followed the timing of the closures closely by county and affected educational
attainment and infant health differently for women on either side of 17.75 by
the first quarter of the reform year. From a comprehensive reading on Chinese
history in the 1970s and 1980s, I find land reform between 1978 and 1984 as a
potential confounder. The reform replaced collective farming in Mao’s era with
household farming, and is widely documented to have greatly improved agri-
cultural productivity since the late 1970s (e.g. Lin, 1992). As a consequence, the
opportunity cost of schooling increased following the reform, which resulted
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in higher dropout rates in rural areas since 1978 (Lin, 1993; Hannum, 1999). In
addition, the cooperative medical system in Mao’s era collapsed following land
reform. Although it is hard to imagine differential impacts of changes in health
care for women close to 17.75, I can account for any change in health care pro-
vision by controlling for exposure to land reform. Using data on the timing of
land reform by county that I collected from county gazetteers, I provide direct
evidence in Section 6.2 that land reform does not account for any effects of the
school closures.
The second hypothesis is that, because many rural middle schools were
also closed after the Cultural Revolution, women younger than 18 when high
schools were closed might have dropped out when middle schools were closed
a few years earlier. If the decline in high school completion at 17.75 is induced
by the closures of middle schools two years ago, we should also observe a dis-
continuous drop of women’s middle school completion at 17.75 by the time of
the high school closures. In Section 6.3, however, I show that there is no evi-
dence of a discontinuity in women’s middle school completion at 17.75.
Finally, an advantage of this study is that internal migration in China, es-
pecially rural-to-urban migration, had been strictly restricted by the household
registration system (theHukou system) by the early 1990s. The first relaxation of
the Hukou system was in 1985 when the Ministry of Public Security authorized
a temporary urban resident permit (urbanHukou) for those temporarily migrat-
ing for business (Wang, 2005). The next substantial change was a new urban
Hukou for rural migrants open to more cities endorsed by the central govern-
ment in 1992 (Chan and Zhang, 1999). The Hukou system has two important
implications for potential concerns about migration in this study. First, before
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the first relaxation of the Hukou policies in 1985, it was not possible for individ-
uals to move to other counties to continue education when rural high schools
were closed from 1977 to 1984. Second, the migration rate in the rural popula-
tion was still very low in the early 1990s when the 1992 CCS was conducted. In
the 1990 Census, only 5.1 percent of women born in 1953-1972 who are at risk
of becoming mothers in my sample migrated from rural areas.
1.5 Main Results
1.5.1 Fertility choices
The effect of education on fertility choices would lead to either a sample selec-
tion problem or a complication in interpreting the effect of maternal education
on infant health, or both. To provide direct evidence on these possible con-
cerns, I begin my empirical analysis by estimating the reduced form effects of a
woman’s exposure to the school closures on her selection into motherhood and
maternal age at first birth.
The graphical presentation on the relationship between observed mother-
hood and one’s age by the first quarter in the first year of the school closures is
in Figure 4. Each point presents the fraction of mothers observed in each cell by
age in quarter. The vertical bar at age 17.75 denotes the oldest cohort exposed to
the closures. If a woman’s decision to become a mother is affected by her expo-
sure to the closures, wewould expect a break in the trend at age 17.75. However,
the pattern on either side of the vertical bar is smooth. In Table 2, column (1) of
Panel A presents the estimated effect of a woman’s exposure to the closures on
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her selection into motherhood, which is estimated by fitting a quadratic cohort
trend in equation (3). The estimated effect, -0.0067, is extremely small relative to
the sample mean of 0.92, and it is statistically insignificant. There is no evidence
that women on either side of age 17.75 have different probabilities of becoming
mothers. This finding reduces the concern about endogenous sample selection
induced by one’s exposure to the school closures.
The same is true for maternal age at first birth as shown in Figure 5. The
trend declines in a manner by age in year, and it appears continuous at age
17.75. I examine whether the closures of high schools shifted maternal age at
first birth to under 18 and report the estimate in column (2) of Panel A. The
estimate is statistically insignificant and has the opposite sign to the expectation.
To further explore whether high school closures have any effect on maternal age
at first birth, I separately estimate reduced form for each possible maternal age
from 13 to 36, and report one estimate for each age in Panel B. I do not find
evidence that mothers exposed to the closures are more likely to have their first
birth before age 18. The main effects of one’s exposure to the closures are to
reduce the probability of having the first birth at 22 by 2.5 percentage points
and increase the probability at age 21 by 3.3 percentage points. As suggested
by Royer (2004), these changes within the safe age range are unlikely to have
negative effect on infant health. There are very small decreases at age 15 and 17
that are significant at 10 percent level, whichwould have small positive effect on
infant health, if any, the opposite to the effect of the school closures. Therefore,
if a woman’s exposure to the school closures has any negative effect on infant
health, it is implausible to attribute the effect to changes in maternal age at first
birth induced by the closures.
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That I find negligible effect of the school closures on fertility choices is inter-
esting in light of the literature on education and fertility in developing countries.
I provide two possible interpretations. First, while education interventions tar-
geting lower levels of schooling have been found to reduce teenage pregnancy
(Black et al., 2008; Duflo et al., 2011; Ozier, 2011), women on the margin of being
affected by the closure of high schools in this study were close to 18. Second, it
is not surprising that the closures mainly shifted maternal age at first birth from
22 to 21, because “late marriage and late births” had been a family planning
policy since the 1970s and the 1980 marriage law set a legal marriage age at 20
for women.
1.5.2 Educational attainment
After having found negligible effect of women’s exposure to the school closures
on fertility choices, this subsection turns to educational attainment using the
sample of mothers. Figure 6 shows the relationship between high school com-
pletion and one’s age by the first quarter of the year the school closures started.
Three main features should be noted in this figure. First, consistent with ex-
pectations, a sharp and sizable drop in the fraction of mothers who completed
high school appears at age 17.75. The rate of high school completion decreases
from 12 percent at 18 to 8.6 percent at 17.75, roughly a 28 percent decline. Sec-
ond, the Prue- and post exposure trends away from age 17.75 are smooth. If
concerns arise about voluntary dropout prior to the first year of the school clo-
sures in counties that closed schools later, wewould observe that the Prue- trend
declines among individuals older than 17.75. However, such a decline is not
observed. The smoothness of the Prue- and post trends and the sharp discon-
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tinuity on either side of 17.75 together support interpreting the discontinuous
change in education as the effect of the high school closures. Finally, this figure
also provides visual guidance for choosing an appropriate polynomial order to
fit the cohort trend. Because the Prue-exposure trend is linear, I use linear trend
for the main specification. I also report results using a quadratic or a cubic poly-
nomial as robustness checks.
Estimates of the drop in high school completion at age 17.75 are presented
in Table 3. I report the first stage estimates for the sample of all mothers in col-
umn (1)-(4) and for the subsample of mothers who report the birth weight of
their first birth in column (5)-(8) separately.22 Column (1) reports the baseline
estimate by fitting a quadratic cohort trend without any co variates. I find a de-
cline of 2.8 percentage points in high school completion induced by the school
closures, an effect size slightly smaller than that observed in Figure 6. Control-
ling for quarter of birth effects in column (2) and adding county fixed effects in
column (3) do not change the point estimate and the standard error. The point
estimate changes slightly to 2.7 percentage points when county specific trends
are controlled for in column (4). It is a 22.5 percent decline from the high school
completion rate at age 18. I focus on the estimate in column (4) because it is the
average departure from county specific cohort trends as captured by the within-
county comparisons. These effects are all precisely estimated and the precision
is not changed by controlling for additional co variates. The estimated effects
in column (5)-(8) are very similar in magnitude relative to the mean level in the
subsample of mothers.
A final remark is on interpreting the incomplete education in high school for
22I find no statistically significant effect of being exposed to the school closures on reporting
the birth weight of the first birth.
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women affected by the school closures. Compared to women at 18 who had just
graduated from high school when the closures started, those at 17.75 who had
to drop out have one year less education, which accounted for half of the high
school education at that time; they also do not have a high school diploma.
1.5.3 Infant health outcomes
This subsection focuses on the analysis of infant health for the first births. I
show the reduced form graphs on gestational age in Figure 7, prematurity in
Figure 8, neonatal mortality rate in Figure 9, infant mortality rate in Figure 10,
birth weight in Figure 11 and low birthweight in Figure 12. If one more year
of high school education improves infant health, we would expect that the inci-
dence of poor infant health measures, including prematurity, low birthweight,
neonatal mortality and infant mortality rate, would have both a declining pat-
tern among Prue-exposure cohorts and a discontinuous increase at age 17.75.
However, trends of these four measures are generally noisy. The probabilities
of prematurity and low birthweight jump at age 17.75, but these changes might
not be statistically different from zero.
Before turning to reduced form estimates on infant health, I report OLS es-
timates in Panel A of Table 4. Maternal age at birth, county fixed effects and
mother’s year of birth effects are controlled for. Maternal high school comple-
tion reduces infant mortality by 0.39 percentage points (18 percent) and low
birthweight by 0.97 percentage points (24 percent), and increases birth weight
by 57 grams. The observational evidence, consistent with previous correlational
studies, suggests that one more year of high school education improves infant
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health along these three dimensions.
Reduced form estimates on infant health outcomes in Panel B of Table 4,
however, are all statistically insignificant. A mother’s exposure to the school
closures shortens her gestational age by 0.009 months, less than half a day. The
probability of prematurity is increased by 0.003 percentage points, which is eco-
nomically very small relative to 2.2 percent at age 18 and not statistically differ-
ent from zero. The estimated effect on the probability of neonatal mortality (in 1
month) is an decrease of 0.0018 percentage points, while the estimated decrease
in the probability of infant mortality (in 1 year) is 0.0016 percentage points. Both
effects have the opposite sign to the expectations, but they are small relative to
the mean levels at age 18 and imprecisely estimated. In the last two columns,
I use the subsample of mothers who report the birth weight of their first birth.
A mother’s exposure to the closures decreases the birth weight of her first birth
by 10.35 grams, a very small effect relative to 3288 grams at age 18. The sign
of the estimate on low birthweight is opposite to the expectation. Again these
estimates are also statistically indistinct from zero.
Panel C in Table 4 reports the instrumental variables estimates of the effect
of maternal high school completion on infant health, using a mother’s exposure
to the school closures as the instrument of her high school completion. One
more year of high school education increases gestational age of the first child
by 0.33 months. The estimated effects on prematurity of -0.093 is economically
large relative to the sample average, which provides suggestive evidence on a
large effect of maternal education on reducing the risk of prematurity, but the
estimate is statistically indistinguishable from zero. The estimate on neonatal
mortality (0.07 relative to the sample mean at 0.014) and infant mortality (0.065
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relative to the sample mean at 0.02) are large in magnitude but have opposite
sign to the expectations as well as little precision. Finally, the estimates on birth
weight and low birthweight are large in economic terms but both are imprecise.
1.5.4 Other outcomes relevant to infant health
To understand why there is no evidence that maternal high school comple-
tion improves infant health, I further discuss the effects of women’s exposure
to the closures on a number of potential mechanisms, including labor market
outcomes, health behaviors, their husbands’ education and labor market out-
comes.23 Table 5 reports reduced form estimates using the 1992 CCS. Not sur-
prisingly, in column (1)-(3), estimates on employment status, working in non-
farm jobs andworking in white-collar jobs are all very small and statistically not
different from zero. Among them, being employed and off-farm employment
have the opposite sign to the expectations. These findings are consistent with
previous studies that find zero or even negative earnings returns to education
from the late 1970s to the early 1990s in rural China (Gregory and Meng, 1995;
Li and Zhang, 1998).
Although the income channel from the labor market in very weak, one more
year in high school might directly improve health behavior if women’s ability to
proceed health information is improved at this margin of education. I focus on
women’s prenatal care and delivery, which could well capture their awareness
of benefits associated with health services in this context, because local govern-
ments subsidized prenatal care and delivery for women planning authorized
births in rural areas (Short and Zhang, 2004) and my findings relate to the first
23Both the 1992 CCS and the 1990 Census do not report individual earnings.
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births. In column (4)-(6), however, I find little evidence that women’s exposure
to the closures affects whether they have any prenatal health check, whether
have one in the first trimester and whether deliver the birth in hospital.
Assortative mating in the marriage market suggests that better educated
women would marry better educated and wealthier men. Because data on men
in the 1992 CCS are of low quality, I use the sample of the same 400 counties
in the 1990 Census to examine paternal education and labor market outcomes.
In Table 6, the first stage estimate for women is reported in column (1). The
decline in high school completion is 2.5 percentage points, which is very close
to the estimate using the 1992 CCS. In column (2), the school closures reduce a
woman’s probability of marrying a man that completed high school by 1.3 per-
centage points. Estimates on the husband’s labor market outcomes in column
(3)-(5) suggests that women tend to marry men with similar labor market per-
formances. But again, these estimates are small and statistically insignificant.
1.6 Robustness
In this section, I first provide evidence that women on either side of age 17.75
are similar along a number of predetermined dimensions. Next, I test for, and
rule out two alternative hypotheses that might also explain the decline of high
school completion.
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1.6.1 Testing continuity of predetermined characteristics
If there were other negative selections on women at 17.75 in the first quarter of
the first closure year, it would not be plausible to attribute the decline in high
school completion to the sole effect of the school closures. For example, if less
educated parents of women (called grandparents hereafter) were more likely to
give birth in the second quarter of 1961, wemight expect a decline in high school
completion at 17.75 by the first quarter of 1979 due to lower endowments from
grandparents, which could partly account for the decline in counties that closed
schools in 1979.
An ideal test would be on the continuity of predetermined characteristics
on either side of 17.75. Unfortunately, little information prior to marriage is
recorded in the 1992 CCS. Alternatively, using another nationwide survey, the
1988 Two per Thousand Fertility Survey, I conduct birth cohort analysis for
women at risk of becoming mothers in my sample. Specifically, I test whether
women born in the second quarter are systematically different from those born
in the first quarter for each year in 1960-1963, who were around 17.75 when
schools were closed between 1978 and 1981.24 The specification is an analogue
to the reduced form in equation (3); only the regressor of interest is an indicator
variable that is equal to 1 if born in the second quarter or later for a particular
year in 1960-1963 and 0 otherwise. The analysis sample includes rural women
born 6 years before and 6 years after that year.
In Table 7, I report estimates on an extensive set of predetermined character-
istics, including grandparental education, grandmother’s age at birth, women’s
24I am not able to estimate the reduced form on predetermined characteristics directly, be-
cause county identifiers are not releases in the 1988 Two per Thousand Fertility Survey.
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own parity, months of breastfeeding, neonatal mortality and infant mortality.
Each panel shows results by testing discontinuous changes between the first
and second quarters in each year from 1960 to 1963 separately. Each estimate
is for a different characteristic. The vast majority of the 36 estimates are small
and statistically insignificant, suggesting little selection of female births in the
second quarter of these years. Only two estimates are significant at 5 percent
level. The neonatal mortality and infant mortality rates among women born in
the second quarter of 1961 are lower. If lower mortality rates indicate better
quality, we would expect higher rate of high school completion at 17.75 in coun-
ties that closed schools in 1979, which is the opposite to the decline induced by
the school closures Only one estimate, middle school completion of grandpar-
ents whose wives gave birth in the second quarter of 1962, is significant at the
10 percent level and is very small in magnitude. Overall, these findings support
the validity of the identifying assumption that women at risk of being around
17.75 at the closures are very similar along many predetermined dimensions.
1.6.2 Alternative hypothesis 1: Land reform
There are 306 counties that report the timing of both high school closures and
land reform and that are matched with the 1992 CCS. I directly control for one’s
exposure to land reform in the first stage and reduced form estimation in the
sample of 306 counties. One’s exposure to land reform is assigned as 1 if one
was at 17.75 by the first quarter in the first year of land reform and 0 otherwise.
Every column (1) in Table 8 reports the estimated effect of the school closures
without the control of land reform, and every column (2) reports the estimated
effects of both reforms. One’s exposure to land reform has a negative, but very
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small and statistically insignificant effect on high school completion. The first
stage estimates on the effect of the school closures in both columns are very
close. Reduced form estimates show that a woman’s exposure to the school
closures decreases her gestational age by 0.015 months at 5 percent significant
level and increases the probability of prematurity by 0.006 percentage points
at 10 percent significant level. These results provide suggestive evidence on a
positive effect of maternal education on reducing prematurity in this subsample
of counties. Controlling for one’s exposure land reform does not alter the esti-
mated effects of the school closures on most infant health measures, except for
a sign reversal on low birthweight, which is also imprecisely estimated.
1.6.3 Alternative hypothesis 2: Closures of middle schools
If rural middle schools were closed systematically two years prior to the clo-
sures of high schools, the decline in high school completion at 17.75 might be
due to dropout from middle schools when these women were 15.75. The esti-
mated effect of being at 17.75 when high schools were closed on one’s middle
school completion is -0.017 with a standard error of 0.013, which reduces con-
cerns about earlier closures of middle schools.
1.7 Treatment Heterogeneity
The effect of the school closures on high school completion could be heteroge-
neous across regions. We might expect a larger first stage in two types of areas.
First, because the goal of the reform was to close all the rural high schools built
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during the Cultural Revolution, counties that built more had to close more, gen-
erating a larger negative shock to individuals still in school. Second, these clo-
sures essentially increased the costs of continuing and completing high school
for the rural population. In less densely populated areas where the travel costs
are higher, dropout rate might be larger. I test these two possibilities and report
results in Table 9. In the first two columns, I divide the sample of counties by
the pre-existing education level.25 Interestingly, the school closures have no ef-
fect on high school completion in counties below the median education level,
while the decline in high school completion is as high as 32 percent in counties
above the median. In the last two columns of the first row, consistent with the
expectations, the decline in percentage of high school completion is larger in
less densely populated areas (30 percent) than that in more populated areas (19
percent).
If the relationship between maternal high school completion and infant
health is nonlinear, we might expect an effect of maternal education on infant
health in counties with higher pre-existing education level and with lower pop-
ulation density. From the second to the seventh row of the first two columns,
reduced form estimates on infant health measures in both types of counties are
all imprecisely estimated. There is no evidence that a larger decline in mater-
nal high school completion has led to larger changes in infant health outcomes.
Similarly, in the last two columns, estimates are close in magnitude and are all
statistically insignificant. Despite the heterogeneous effects of the school clo-
sures on high school completion, these reduced form estimates further confirm
that maternal high school completion has little effect on infant health.
25Because only a few county gazetteers report the number of high schools built during the
Cultural Revolution, I measure the pre-existing education level by the fraction of mothers that
completed high schools among pre-exposure cohorts at age 18-23 at the time of the closures.
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1.8 Conclusion
This study provides new evidence on the effect of maternal high school edu-
cation on infant health by exploiting the massive closures of rural high schools
right after the Cultural Revolution in China. Compared to women just a few
quarters older and who had just graduated from high school when the school
closures started, women still in the final year are 22.5 percent less likely to com-
plete high school. However, there is no evidence that the large decline in ma-
ternal high school completion induced by the closures has an effect on infant
health, as captured by prematurity, low birthweight, neonatal mortality and
infant mortality. In addition, I find that a woman’s exposure to the closures
has negligible effect on her selection into motherhood and maternal age at first
birth, suggesting that the estimated effects on infant health are not confounded
by fertility choices.
The narrow comparisons among women born quarters apart but who had
distinct exposures to the closures within county provides credible evidence.
First, both the closures of high schools and the change in the school entry date
policy were unpredictable for these women and their parents. Second, I pro-
vide evidence that women being compared are very similar in terms of observ-
able, predetermined characteristics. Third, I rule out two alternative hypotheses
that might interpret the discontinuous change in high school completion. One
is land reform between 1978 and 1984, and another is the closures of middle
schools prior to the closures of high schools. Finally, for the particular episode
in rural China, concerns about endogenous mobility are less important.
Using a quasi-experiment on education, that I do not find an effect of ma-
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ternal high school education on infant health is a local effect, which is more
relevant to the subpopulation of women from low socioeconomic background
and is specific to one more year in high school.
I discuss three possible interpretations to my findings in the context of rural
China from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, during which infant health out-
comes are observed. First, the income channel is very weak in this setting. Dur-
ing the initial transition from a central planned economy to a market-oriented
one, the labor market was dysfunctional and rewarded little to schooling. On
the other hand, there is also no evidence of marital sorting by education level.
Second, the cooperative medical system in Mao’s era collapsed since the late
1970s. The coverage of collective health care on the rural population went down
from 90 percent in the 1970s to 5 percent in the mid- 1980s (Hsiao, 1995). Al-
though better educated women might have more access to health care services
in the privatized system, the quality of health care provision in rural areas was
generally very poor, which might have limited the role of maternal education.
Finally, the cost of health information transmission was lowered by infor-
mation campaigns under the birth control policies since the early 1970s. Under
the theme “fewer and better births”, these campaigns were widespread in the
countryside. In such environment, the marginal effect of one more year in high
school on acquiring information about improving child health might be mini-
mal.
37
CHAPTER 2
LONG-TERM EFFECT OF IN UTERO EXPOSURE TO LAND REFORMON
ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE IN CHINA
2.1 Introduction
In Heckman (2007), investing early in childhood is more productive in produc-
ing the multidimensional capabilities, including cognitive skills, noncognitive
skills and health stocks, than investing in later developmental stages. The mul-
tiplier effects of early inputs imply that public policies affecting the in utero en-
vironment might be more efficient in promoting human capital than traditional
education policies. Empirically, while a growing body of the “fetal origins” lit-
erature explores the later-life impacts of extreme shocks in utero, evidence on
early-life exposure to public policies affecting economic wellbeing is relatively
thin (Almond and Currie, 2011b). These extreme and often episodic events
(famine, war, etc.) are widely used because they can provide credible research
design. On the other hand, the long-term effects of these shocks may not be gen-
eralizable to those of public policies that lead tomild but permanent increases in
resources and that are relevant for a broader population. Likewise, knowledge
of how parental resources and their timing causally affect children’s human cap-
ital development is scant, largely because exogenous shocks to parental income
are rare in the real world (Currie, 2009).
In this paper, we examine the long-term effect of in utero exposure to the
post-Mao land reform between 1978 and 1984 in China on academic perfor-
mance on college entrance exams. Previously in Mao’s era, agriculture was
collectivized and the incentive to work was low. The reform replaced the col-
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lective system with the Household Responsibility System (HRS), under which
collectively owned land was contracted to individual households who can re-
ceive all income from the land after meeting the tax and quota sales obligations
to the state (Perkins, 1988). Essentially, an incentive scheme was provided that
more tightly linked reward to effort. McMillan et al., (1989) and Lin (1992) doc-
ument that the reform accounted for more than half of the agricultural output
growth in China between 1978 and 1984. The rural poverty rate also declined
dramatically following the reform. McMillan (2002) refers to the reform as “the
world’s largest antipoverty program”. Thus, we use the reform as a positive
income shock that leads to nutritional improvement for individuals exposed to
the reform in utero.
Distinct from the previous literature that relies on the provincial variation
of the HRS diffusion (McMillan et al., 1989; Lin, 1992), we exploit the fact that
the reform decision was made at a more local level and the reform timing varies
from 1978 to 1984. We use new data on the year the reform started by county
that we collected from county gazetteers ever published since the 1980s. These
county-level data can be linked for 1,068 counties to microdata on the universe
of college entrance exam scores between 1999 and 2001 in nearly 2 million test-
ing records. The matched data allow us to assign one’s exposure to the reform
by one’s year of birth and county of birth. An appealing feature of our study is
that the scope for bias from endogenous migration is minimal, because we ob-
serve each test taker’s county before age 1 in themicrodata.1 Moreover, mobility
of parents induced by demand for land between 1978 and 1984 was unlikely be-
cause land was allocated based on family size within one’s village of birth, and
internal migration had been under strict control under the Hukou system since
1This stands in contrast to the United States, where large sample microdata generally do not
report county of birth.
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the 1950s until its first relaxation in 1985 (Wang, 2005).
Our empirical strategy is a difference-in-difference approach that compares
academic performance among individuals born before and after the first post-
reform harvest between counties that reformed earlier and those that reformed
later. The key identifying assumption is no systematic differences in the pre-
existing trends of academic performance across counties with different reform
timing. We have included county time trends that capture any differential pat-
terns for test takers born prior to the first harvest across counties. Moreover,
through comprehensive reading on the evolution of the reform policy and the
previous literature at the province level, we also find out the primary determi-
nants of the reform timing at the county level and account for their possibly
time-varying effects. Lastly, it is unlikely that other reforms followed the timing
of land reform closely by county and have had differential impacts for indi-
viduals born before and after the first harvest, except for the One Child Policy
(OCP). To directly account for any confounding effect of OCP, we collected a
novel dataset on the timing of OCP implementation by county for more than
900 counties and find robust results after controlling for one’s exposure to OCP.
We first echo the previous studies by finding the productivity gain of land
reform at the county level, which started one year after the reform. We then
find that high school students born two years after the reform perform better
on college entrance exams, particularly on math. They are also more likely to
be admitted by first-tier and top ranked colleges. The impact estimates are rela-
tively modest in magnitude: math test scores increase by just under 1% and at-
tending a selective college by 4-5%. Interestingly, these effects are substantially
stronger for boys. Furthermore, we test for, and rule out possible hypotheses
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about endogenous selection into the sample of test takers. There is no evidence
that land reform affects fertility, gender, one’s chances of going to high school
or high school dropout, one’s decisions to apply for college and take the college
entrance exams, and one’s age at the exams.
Our paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, it expands the fe-
tal origins literature to examine the long-term effect of in utero income shock
induced by public policy on human capital, and thus helps inform the policy
relevance of the fetal origins effects. To the best of our knowledge, only two pa-
pers have explored the later-life impacts of public policies, which are Head Start
program in Ludwig and Miller (2007) and Food Stamp Program in Almond et
al., (2011). Furthermore, a handful of studies that well identify the long-term
effects of early-life income shocks mostly consider health outcomes (Van Den
Berg et al., 2006; Banerjee et al., 2010; Almond et al., 2011).2 In this paper, we
use the 1978-84 land reform in China as a positive shock to household income
and focus on academic performance that captures cognitive skills. Our find-
ings suggest that development policy can indeed lay the foundation of human
capital accumulation by targeting the in utero environment.
Second, we provide evidence and an analytical framework for interpreting
gender difference in the fetal origins effects as observed in many studies (e.g.,
Van Den Berg et al., 2006; Field et al., 2009; Maccini and Yang 2009; Almond
et al, 2010; Bhalotra and Venkataramani, 2011).3 The epidemiological litera-
2Van Den Berg et al., (2006) find that individuals born during economic expansions lived
longer than those born during economic downturns in the Netherlands. Banerjee et al., (2010)
show that children exposed to the phylloxera in French vineyards in the 19th century were
shorter in adulthood. Almond et al., (2011) find positive effect of being exposed to the Food
Stamp Program early in childhood on adult health and weaker effect on economic outcomes.
3VanDen Berg et al., (2006) find that exposure to adverse economic condition at birth increase
mortality rate for men but not for women. Bhalotra and Venkataramani (2011) find that men
exposed to sulfa drugs in infancy benefit more in terms of schooling, employment and income
in adulthood. Almond et al., (2010) find that men exposed to famine are more likely to be
41
ture generally assumes biological difference by gender and ignores parental re-
sponses that might be shaped by gender discrimination (e.g., Kraemer, 2000).
A purely biological difference, however, can not be fully reconciled with exist-
ing evidence, for example, the larger negative effects of rainfall shock at birth
for women in Maccini and Yang (2009). On the other hand, recent work on re-
sponsive investments shows that parents reinforce by investing more on better
endowed children (Datar et al., 2010; Adhvaryu and Nyshadham, 2011).4 In the
context of a society with son preference, it is particularly important to consider
how reinforcement of parents might generate the gender difference. We demon-
strate that while biology is unlikely to explain the gender difference in the effect
of land reform, our evidence is consistent with differential responses of parents
for boys and for girls.
Finally, despite the wide recognition of the 1978-84 land reform as the en-
gine of China’s transition to a market economy, the existing evidence on the
reform effects has not gone beyond productivity growth and has been limited
at the province level (McMillan et al., 1989; Lin, 1992). Little is known about
the broader impacts of the reform on other dimensions of human wellbeing,
such as health and education, particularly at the individual level. Our study is
among the first to document long-term non-production benefits of the reform.
From a policy perspective, the persistent effect of the reform on promoting hu-
man capital adds to understanding social returns to antipoverty programs and
illiterate, less likely to work and get married. In contrast, Field et al., (2009) find that exposure
to iodine supplementation in utero increases schooling for girls, but not for boys, in Tanzania.
Maccini and Yang (2009) find larger influences of a rainfall shock in the birth year on women’s
health, education and economic outcomes later in life.
4Datar et al., (2010) show that low birth weight children are less likely to be breastfed, have
fewer well-baby visits, are less likely to be immunized, and are less likely to attend preschool
than normal birth weight siblings. Adhvaryu and Nyshadham (2011) find that parents reinforce
the higher cognitive endowments of children who received in utero iodine supplementation, by
investing more in vaccinations and early life nutrition.
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improving the cost-benefit analysis of these programs in developing countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
background on the post-Mao land reform, provides evidence on productivity
gain following the reform at the county level, and describes the education sys-
tem in China. Section 3 describes the microdata on test scores and admission
outcomes. Section 4 discusses our empirical approach. Section 5 presents pre-
liminary results.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 The post-Mao land reform
China had pursued collective agriculture for more than two decades since the
mid-1950s. Under this system, workers generally received daily fixed work
points and got paid at the end of the year (Lin, 1988). The incentive to work
was low and agricultural productivity was stagnant. From 1956 to 1977, there
had been virtually no change in grain output per capita (Zweig, 1987). Follow-
ing the death of Mao Zedong and the end of the Cultural Revolution, a decol-
lectivization reform was initiated in 1978. By contracting collectively owned
land to individual households on a long-term basis,5 the reform shifted the ba-
sic decision-making unit from the collective farm to the household. The new
system was called the Household Responsibility System (HRS), under which
individual households could make their own input decisions and receive all in-
come from the land after meeting the tax and quota sales obligations to the state
5The earlier land lease was up to 15 years. It was extended to 30 years in 1993.
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(Perkins, 1988; Sicular, 1991).
The HRS was initially worked out by farmers without approval from the
central government (Lin, 1987). At the end of 1978, a small number of pro-
duction teams in Anhui Province, which suffered from a severe drought in that
year, start to experiment with contracting land and output quotas to individual
households (Lin, 1987; Yang, 1996). The initial position of the Central Com-
mittee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on household farming was in a
strong opposition. The document “Regulations on the Management of Rural
People’s Commune” passed by the CCP in the November of 1978 clearly stipu-
lated that contracting to individual households was not permitted.
The prohibition was relaxed in September 1979 by allowing a few excep-
tions to households living in areas that were peripheral, distant, mountainous,
and isolated due to transportation difficulties.6 In September 1980, the Central
Document No.75 issued by the Central Committee further allowed poor and
remote areas and production units heavily dependent on state subsidies to con-
tract land and output quota to households. By August 1981, the Central Com-
mittee’s position on household farming became more liberalized in a mission
sent to fifteen provinces “contracting to households is not only a means of re-
lieving poverty but also ways of enhancing productivity; and it hasn’t changed
the production relations of the collective economy”.7 In January 1982, the Cen-
tral Document No.1 officially announced that “the HRS is the production re-
sponsibility system of the socialist economy”, which first showed the CCP’s
commitment to popularize HRS.
6Agriculture Yearbook of China 1980, 1981, Beijing, Agricultural Press.
7People’s Daily, August 4th, 1981
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2.2.2 Variation in the reform timing
Data on the timing of land reform at the county level were previously undiscov-
ered. We have collected new data on the year HRS was introduced by county
from 1242 county gazetteers in which local history from 1949 to the 1980s was
recorded. Specifically, it is the year when collectively owned land was first con-
tracted to individual households in a few villages of each county; and it usually
took 2-3 years to spread the HRS to the whole county. These counties represent
two-thirds of all counties that have ever published gazetteers.8 Because land
reform occurred in rural areas, our sample includes locations that were rural
counties at the time of the reform.9 In Figure 13, we plot the fraction of counties
that had introduced HRS between 1978 and 1984. Only 1.85 percent of coun-
ties were the reform pioneers in 1978. The vast majority reformed between 1979
and 1981, with the peak of 45 percent in 1980. By 1984, all counties had adopted
HRS.
Unlike many top-down policy implementations, the 1978-84 land reform is a
bottom-up process. The reform timing by county is therefore not randomly as-
signed. Fortunately, what drives the local timing has not been a black box. The
evolution of the reform policies suggests two primary sources of the variation:
drought and poverty prior to the reform. A severe drought led to large declines
in agricultural production, which in turn provided the local government incen-
tive to reform.10 Particularly, the negative production shock spurred taking the
8The other one-third of counties do not report the timing of HRS adoption, or report it as
“the late 1970s” or “the early 1980s”, which are not useful for our identification strategy.
9City districts are defined and excluded by using the county code in the 1982 Census and the
official definition.
10Bai and Kung (2011) provide indirect evidence using province level data. They find that
provinces that suffered more in the 1959-61 Famine started land reform earlier when struck by
bad weather. The interpretation is that the Famine experience undermined the local belief that
collective farming could effectively cope with negative weather shocks.
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political risk as reform starters, since contracting land to individual households
were not permitted in earlier years. Poor and remote counties were among the
first permitted to adopt HRS by the central government as a means to reduce
national poverty rates.
Moreover, existing literature on HRS adoption at the province level provides
three additional insights (Lin, 1987; Yang, 1996; Chung, 2000). First, the diffu-
sion of HRS was faster where reduction in monitoring cost is higher and thus
productivity gains are larger. Using size of production team to measure moni-
toring cost, previous studies show mixed findings.11 The second hypothesis is
that provinces that suffered more from the 1959-61 Famine reformed earlier, be-
cause the more painful the lesson from the Famine, the less likely the province
to favor collective farming. Supportive evidence is provided by Yang (1996)
and Bai and Kung (2011). Lastly, Yang (1996) argues that provinces further from
Beijing had more freedom to initiate earlier reform.
We provide the first evidence on the correlation between land reform timing
and potential determinants at the county level. By matching the county-level
data on reform timing with county-by-year data on precipitation (See Data Ap-
pendix), we examine whether drought had led to land reform. Notably, land
reform is an irreversible event, implying that drought prior to reform might af-
fect the decision to reform, but drought after would not. In this test, we assign
one to the first year of reform, zero before the first year and missing values after.
As suggested by Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (1984), the growth
of rice, the number one grain output in China, largely depends on rainfall at
the beginning of the growing season, which starts in March or April. If drought
11Lin (1987) finds that provinces with larger production teams reformed earlier, while Chung
(2000) has the opposite finding.
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affected reform timing through its impact on crop yield, we would expect a
stronger correlation regarding spring drought. In Table 10, column 1 shows no
correlation between the first year of reform and drought defined by average
monthly precipitation in the whole growing season (March to September) in the
reform year and the year before.12 From column 2 to 5, we measure drought by
monthly precipitation from March to June separately. Consistent with the ex-
pectations, droughts in March and April of the reform year and one year before
increased the probability of earlier reform, which are all statistically significant
at the one percent level. In contrast, droughts in May and June had no impact
on the reform timing.
Next, to test the cross-sectional relationship between reform timing and
other local characteristics as discussed above, we have collected and constructed
county-level measures prior to the reform from various sources. Poverty is
captured by grain output per capital in 1977 that are collected from county
gazetteers, and remoteness is measured by distance to province capital using
1982 Census. Size of production team is proxied by the density of labor force
(aged 16-60) in 1977.13 Famine intensity is measured by the average birth co-
hort size in 1953-1957 divided by the average cohort size in 1959-1961 using the
1982 Census.14 We also calculate the distance to Beijing to capture freedom in
local policy-making. Table 11 reports both estimates from univariate regression
for each determinant and those from multivariate regressions. Consistent with
previous literature, counties that were initially poor, that had larger production
teams in 1977 and higher famine intensity in 1959-1961, and further from the
12Because the first month of reform are mostly not documented, a drought in the growing
season is likely to affect reform at the second half of the current year or next year.
13Density is calculated by population size aged 16-60 in 1977 divided by area at the county
level using 1982 Census.
14Meng et al. (2009) use a similar measure of famine intensity using the 1990 Census.
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central government decided to reform earlier. Controlling for grain output per
capita in 1977 forces us to drop two thirds of the sample due to lack of data.
To get close to the full sample with data on reform timing and explore the ro-
bustness, we omit grain output in the last column and find robust results for
labor force density and famine intensity, though it decreases the standard error
of distance to Beijing that becomes statistically significant.15
To attribute changes in individual academic performance to prenatal expo-
sure to land reform, it is crucial to account for county features that contribute
to the local decision to reform and that have time varying effects on individual
educational outcomes. In all regressions on the effect of land reform, we con-
trol for the time-variant droughts in March and April in current year and the
year before, as well as time-invariant determinants of reform timing by county
interacted with time fixed effects.
2.2.3 Land reform and productivity gain
By linking rewards directly to effort, the HRS provided economic incentives
to individual households (Sicular, 1991). The reform has been found to have
greatly improved agricultural productivity and increased rural household in-
come between 1978 and 1984. McMillan et al. (1989) suggest that over three-
quarters of the productivity increase during this period could be attributed to
the incentive effects of the HRS. Using provincial data on the diffusion of HRS,
Lin (1992) also finds that the reform accounts for half of the output growth. The
reform is also widely recognized for its achievements in lifting hundreds of mil-
15Grain output per capita in 1977 is negatively correlated with distance to Beijing, and posi-
tively correlated with labor force density in 1977.
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lions of rural households out of poverty (World Bank, 2000).16 It is claimed to
be the largest antipoverty project in the world (McMillan, 2002).
Grain production represents the vast majority of agricultural production
from the 1970s to the mid 1980s in China. Using unique data on total pop-
ulation and total output of grain production by county collected from county
gazetteers,17 we provide the first quantitative evidence on the productivity gain
of the 1978-84 land reform at the county level. There are 400 counties that re-
port both the reform timing and the complete year-by-year total population and
total output of grain production from 1974 to 1984, among which 382 coun-
ties are matched with data on county controls correlated with reform timing.
Records on grain output in the 1970s are particularly valuable because county-
level statistics have been released systematically only since the 1980s in China.
They are also arguably reliable because these data were originally from local
official archives (Xue, 2010).18
We estimate the effect of land reform on grain output per capita in a
difference-in-difference framework and report results in Table 12. In column
1, county fixed effects, year fixed effects, and county specific time trends are
controlled for. Panel A shows that HRS adoption increases grain output per
capita by 3.2 percent, and Panel B presents monotonic increases in grain output
from one year to four years after land reform. The largest output gain appears
four years after the HRS adoption, which is a 16 percent increase. The increases
in grain output are statistically insignificant five years after land reform.19 In
16Official estimates indicate that rural poverty rate declined from 30 percent in 1978 to 5 per-
cent in 1998 (World Bank, 2000).
17Grain crops generally include rice, wheat, corn and potato.
18Because the purpose of compiling county gazetteers is to accurately record local history,
local historians working in the county gazetteer office have less incentive to manipulate the
grain output data.
19This is consistent with a consensus in the literature that China’s agricultural performance
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column 2, we further control for drought in March and April of the current year
and one year before, and other determinants of reform timing interacted with
time fixed effects. The point estimate in Panel A decreases to 2.6 percent and
standard error remains the same, while estimates in Panel B are very similar to
those in column 1.20
Absent income data by year and county (or household) from the 1970s to
1980s, these estimates on grain output are helpful to understand the lower
bound of income change fellowing the reform. Nationwide, changes in pro-
curement price of grain products by year had been universal during this period,
which are accounted for by year fixed effects. Thus, the increase in individual
income from selling grain products would be at most 2.6 percent. In addition,
from a small sample of counties that report year-by-year data on production
of both grain and cash crops, we find that the fraction of grain output only
decreases slightly from 98 percent in 1974 to 93 percent in 1984.21 Previous lit-
erature suggests that land reform led to a more dramatic increase in production
of cash crops. However, because on average cash crop was still a very small
proportion in agricultural production by 1984, we would expect a tight upper
bound of income increase.
The estimated “first stage” effect of land reform on grain output has two im-
slowed down after 1985 (Sicular, 1991; Lin, 1992).
20Our estimated effect of the HRS adoption on productivity gain is much smaller than the
conventional estimate in Lin (1992). An important feature of our identification strategy is in its
ability to control for time varying effects of county characteristics that are correlated with the
timing of HRS adoption. Besides, two additional differences are noticeable. First, while Lin
(1992) measures the HRS adoption by the fraction of production teams that had adopted the
HRS by year for each province, we use the year HRS was first introduced for each county. Sec-
ond, the outcome in Lin (1992) is the value of crop output including grain crops and cash crops,
while we only use grain output. Taken at face value, our findings using a more careful research
design and data at a more local level cast some doubt on the large effect of HRS adoption on
agricultural productivity found in the previous literature.
21Only 36 counties are in this sample. Cash crops include cotton lint, oilseed, sesame, peanut,
etc. We do not use this sample for estimation because of the small sample size.
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plications for our empirical analysis below. First, it provides us with the guid-
ance to assign the timing of exposure status at the individual level. If one was
born two years after the reform, he/she was exposed to a positive income shock
in utero, while those born one year after the reform or earlier were unexposed
in the prenatal period. Second, because the productivity gain and therefore the
income increase induced by land reform is small, we expect that average effect
on individual academic performance generated by land reform is moderate.
2.2.4 Education system in China
Pre-college education in China includes six years in primary school, three years
in middle school and three years in high school. Education in primary school
and middle school has been mandatory since the introduction of a nine-year
compulsory schooling law in 1986. In the final year of middle school, students
take the local entrance exams to get access to high school. Individuals who fail
the exams either move to vocational schools for 3-5 years of study, or stop going
to school. In most provinces, high school students are divided into two tracks:
science and humanity/social science. Math, Chinese and English are the core
subjects for both tracks.22 In addition, the science curricula include physics,
chemistry and biology, while the humanity/social science curricula include his-
tory, geography and political education.
The procedure of admission to college is comprised of two stages. In the first
stage, high school students take the national college entrance exams in their fi-
nal year. These exams last for 12 hours over 3 days from June 7th to 9th. Math,
Chinese and English are the three basic subjects. Depending on the track in high
22Other foreign languages are taught in a few areas, e.g. Russian, Korean, etc.
51
school, an additional subject that combines respective subjects in each track is
required. A test taker’s overall score is a weighted sum of scores from these
four subjects. While the exams are standard for most provinces, there are a
few exceptions. Beijing and Shanghai are allowed to design independent ex-
ams, and more provinces start to have their own exams in recent years. Within
province, the difficulty of the exams also varies between science track and hu-
manity/social track. For example, math exam is designed to be more difficult
for students in the science track, while Chinese exam is relatively easier.
In the second stage, one’s admission to college is determined by his/her to-
tal score on the national exams and his/her preference on colleges. Depending
on the provincial policy, students fill application forms ranking their most pre-
ferred colleges, either before or after the national exams. Colleges set a fixed
enrollment quota for each of the two tracks for each province. To be admitted
by a particular college, a student has to pass the score threshold of that college
for his/her track in the province he/she takes the exams, and has listed that
college in his/her top choices. Thus, student essentially compete against each
other within their track in their province.
On the supply side, there is a clear hierarchy among the 2,300 higher educa-
tion institutions in China. At the bottom of the pyramid are three-year colleges
that typically award associate degrees. Above them are four-year colleges offer-
ing programs in both academic and vocational courses and typically leading to
bachelor degrees. Four-year colleges are classified into first- and second- tier, the
former of which have better reputation and enroll students with higher scores
in the college entrance exams. On the top of the pyramid are 39 elite colleges
and 100 top colleges that most of the government research fundings spend on.23
23People’s Daily Online, “Over 10 billion yuan to be invested in 211 Project”.
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Only test takers at the higher end of the score distribution have access to these
colleges that set the highest thresholds in admission.
2.3 Data
The primary microdata we use cover the universe of applicants in college en-
trance exams between 1999 and 2001. Applicants report their national identifi-
cation number, from which one’s county of hukou registration and date of birth
are precisely obtained. Because one’s hukou status is registered before age 1,
and internal migration was strictly restricted under the Hukou system from the
1970s to the mid 1980s, the county of hukou registration corresponds well to the
in utero county for individuals born during this period. This is an important ad-
vantage of our research design. Migration for college entrance exam has been
widely reported by media. Some parents send their children to high schools in
less developed provinces where the score thresholds in college admission are
set lower. In this setting, having a good measure of one’s in utero county largely
reduces concerns about possibly endogenous mobility.
For each year between 1999 and 2001, we match the microdata with the
county-level data on the timing of land reform based on one’s county of hukou
registration. Although we observe the universe of college applicants in the mi-
crodata, the fraction of provinces that release the national identification number
of applicants increases by year. In 1999, 13 out of 30 provinces release national
ID number, 22 provinces in 2000 and 29 in 2001.24 There are 472 counties that
we can match in both the microdata in 1999 an the county-level data on reform
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/6381319.html.
24Guangdong doesn’t release national ID number in all years.
53
timing, 719 counties in 2000 and 1044 in 2001. In total, we have 1068 counties
matched in both data. The dotted line in Figure 13 shows that the distribution
of the land reform timing in these matched counties is very close to that in all
counties that have ever reported the reform timing.
Our analysis sample includes test takers born between 1978 and 1984, be-
cause the vast majority of test takers during 1999-2001 were at age 17-21 (98%).
An individual’s in utero exposure to land reform is jointly determined by one’s
year of birth and the timing of HRS adoption in his/her county of hukou regis-
tration. We measure in utero exposure to land reform as whether one was born
two years after the reform or later, and use variation across cohorts and coun-
ties to isolate the effect of prenatal exposure on academic performance. In our
sample, there are 43.8 percent of test takers who were exposed to land reform in
utero (the HRS remains in place once adopted). They were born from five years
before the reform to six years after the reform.
We consider two sets of measures on academic performance as the main out-
comes. First, we focus on the total score and scores of the three core subjects:
math, Chinese and English. Because the examsmight vary across provinces and
also between science track and humanity/social science track within province,
all test scores are standardized within province and track.25 In our empirical
analysis, we use the percentile of test score for each subject relative to the sam-
ple of test takers within province and track. Second, we examine a set of admis-
sion outcomes, including whether one was admitted by any college, by a 4-year
university, by a first-tier university, by a top 100 university or by one of the 39
elite universities. Our analysis sample includes 1,918,244 complete records on
25We use the official formula of standardization used by the Ministry of Education.
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total score and admission outcomes.26
Table 13 reports summary statistics of the analysis sample. While total scores
of male and female students are very close, the variation among male students
is larger. Male students perform slightly better in math exam, while female
students perform better in Chinese and English exams. On admission outcomes,
more than half of all test takers, 53 percent, are admitted by any college. There
are 25.1 percent admitted by a four-year university and 10.6 percent admitted by
a first-tier university. A small proportion of them, 6.7 percent, have access to a
top 100 university, and only 2.4 percent go to an elite university. While the ratio
of being admitted by any college is slightly higher among female test takers,
male test takers perform better in terms of being admitted to higher ranked
universities.
2.4 Empirical Framework
2.4.1 Identification strategy
To infer the causal relationship between in utero exposure to land reform and
later-life academic performance, two major challenges exist. The first challenge
is to overcome the identification problem: omitted variables which might be
correlated with one’s exposure to land reform. The second challenge concerns
sample selection. The sample of test takers might be a selective one if land
reform affects fertility, or one’s chances of going to high school, or one’s decision
26Among these test takers, 99.5 percent have records on math and Chinese scores and 99.4
percent have records on English score.
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to apply for college and take the national exam, or all of them. Assuming for
the moment that land reform has no impact on one’s selection into the sample
of test takers, we first consider the empirical approach to isolate the effect of
exposure to land reform, and then discuss the sample selection problem in the
next subsection.
Our identification strategy compares individuals who were in utero just be-
fore the first post-reform harvest and those just after. One’s exposure status is
jointly determined by one’s year and county in utero. As suggested by our “first
stage” estimate on grain output, the first cohort exposed to the positive income
shock was born two years after the reform. Using a difference-in-difference ap-
proach, we estimate equation (4) as below:
Yi jte = α+βRe f ormjt+γ j+δt+ηe+φ j∗ t+D￿jtθt+D￿jt−1λt−1+
1984￿
t=1979
(X￿j∗Tt)ρt+εi jte (2.1)
where i denotes the individual, j the in utero county, t the year of birth and
e the year of college entrance exams. Yi jte denotes one’s academic performance,
as captured by test scores and admission outcomes. The variable of interest,
Re f ormjt, is equal to 1 if one was born two years after the land reform or later
and 0 otherwise. A set of fixed effects, county fixed effects γ j, year of birth effects
δt and the exam year effects ηe, are controlled for. These county and time controls
absorb the effects of time invariant county characteristics, national birth cohort
effects, as well as any differences in the college entrance exams and admission
process across provinces or over time. Moreover, we also include county specific
linear trends, φ j ∗ t, to account for county characteristics that change smoothly
over time and that are correlated with the timing of land reform. Because the
identifying assumption is that cohorts born prior to the reform give the right
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counterfactual, including county specific linear trends reduces concern about
pre-existing trends that differ between counties that reformed earlier and those
that reformed later.
Furthermore, we account for time varying effects of county characteris-
tics that are found to drive the reform timing. The time-variant measures on
drought in March and April of the current year are denoted by D￿jt, and drought
of last year is denoted by D￿jt−1. The time-invariant determinants prior to 1978,
including labor force density in 1977, famine intensity in 1959-61 and distance
to Beijing, are denoted by X￿j. We interact these covariates with time fixed effects
from 1979 to 1984, with 1978 omitted.
A specific concern arises if other post-Mao reforms during the same period
also affect long-term human capital. Particularly, because the introduction of
HRS came as part of the whole package of market-oriented reforms in the rural
economy, the other two major reforms, namely, price reform and market re-
form (Lin, 1992), could also increase household income and improve later-life
human capital. To confound the effects of land reform, other reforms should
have followed the timing of land reform closely at the county level and have
had differential impacts on individuals born just before and just after two years
after land reform. However, the increases in procurement prices and in bonuses
for above-quota productions were nationwide in 1979 (Sicular, 1991), and the
reductions in the planning of agricultural production and in the restrictions in
interregional trade were universal state interventions (Lin, 1992). Any effects of
exposure to these two reforms are accounted for by controlling for year of birth
effects δt.
Besides economic reforms, we also conducted a comprehensive reading on
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non-economic reform policies from the late 1970s to the early 1980s. We hypoth-
esize that the One Child Policy (OCP) introduced in 1979 might be a potential
confounder because its implementation varied at the county level, and parents
might invest more in the prenatal period when they can have only one child.
We have collected new data on the year the county government started to im-
plement OCP, which varied from 1978 to 1985. In Figure 14, we plot the distribu-
tion of the timing of both land reform and OCP. Although these reforms started
during the same period, their timing by county is not exactly coincident, which
allows us to uniquely disentangle the effect of land reform from that of OCP. We
find robust results for land reform after one’s exposure to OCP is controlled for.
Another concern is that prenatal exposure to land reform might affect one’s
age at the college entrance exams, which is equal to the exam year minus one’s
year of birth. For example, if individuals exposed to land reform in utero per-
form better in their pre-college education and therefore their chances of repeti-
tion are lower, they would take the exams earlier than those unexposed. In the
presence of such effect, including the exam year effects, ηe, would yield a “bad
control” problem in the identification (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). To directly
address this concern, we estimate equation (1) by using one’s age at the college
entrance exams as the outcome and provide evidence that it is not affected by
one’s exposure to land reform.
Finally, besides raising rural household income, land reform might have
changed other household conditions. The change most relevant to child human
capital is the collapse of rural medical system following the decollectivization.
The coverage by collective health care of the rural population went down from
90 percent in the 1970s to 5 percent in the mid 1980s (Hsiao, 1995). If less ac-
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cess to health care has long-term effect on human capital, we would expect that
the effect is negative, which is the opposite to that of a positive income shock
generated by land reform.
2.4.2 Discussion on sample selection
We observe test scores and admission outcomes for high school graduates who
took the national exam. Selection into this sample might be endogenous to one’s
exposure to land reform for four main reasons. Fertility response to land reform
is the first one. A common concern in the fetal origins literature is about the
scarring effect, suggesting that adverse events experienced in uteromay increase
fetal mortality that removes those in poor health (Almond and Currie, 2011b). If
the positive income shock generated by land reform reduced fetal mortality, our
sample might be negatively selected. Besides possibly biological response, par-
ents might also desire more children after the reform. The shift from collective
farming to household farming increased the value of manual labor and there-
fore household demand for labor. The allocation of land is based on family size,
which also provided parents incentive to havemore children. Moreover, follow-
ing the decollectivization, it more difficult to enforce birth control policies, the
penalties on above-quota births in particular, without a strong collective leader-
ship (White, 1987).27
Second, if exposure to land reform improves one’s performance in the high
school entrance exams, one is more likely to go to high school. Similarly, they
are less likely to drop out if they perform better in high school. Thus, the sample
27Schultz and Zeng (1999) consider the effect of land reform on fertility using data on the
reform timing at the village level and the 1987 in-depth fertility survey. They find that, following
the reform, fertility increased slightly between 1982 and 1984, and declined from 1985 to 1987.
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of high school graduates would be positively selected. In the 2000 Census, there
are 16 percent of individuals born in 1978-84 in our sample of counties who ever
went to high school or were still in high school. Among them, only 2 percent
dropped out in high school.
Third, high school graduates might choose not to apply for college upon
graduation. If one’s exposure to land reform affects one’s decision to apply, the
effect would also be positive because it is students who are not confident in
performing well give up taking the exam. The national statistics show that 89
percent of high school graduates apply for college in 1999, 96 percent in 2000
and 93 percent in 2001.28
Finally, a few outstanding students are exempted from national exam and
guaranteed college admission. If those exposed to land reformwere the top stu-
dents in high school, they are more likely to go to colleges, and better colleges,
without taking exam. Among all applicants in our data, 96.8 percent of them
took the national exam, which might be a negatively selected sample.
We can directly test three out of these four hypotheses. Using the 1990 and
2000 Census, we can estimate the reduced form of exposure to land reform on
fertility, whether one ever attended high school and high school dropout. Using
the administrative data on test scores, we can test the selection from college
applicants to test takers.
Because we do not observe high school graduates who do not apply to col-
lege, the only hypothesis that we can not directly test is about the selection from
high school graduates to applicants. Instead, we use the 1990 and 2000 Census
to obtain the size of high school graduates by county, year of birth and year of
28Educational Statistics Yearbook of China.
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graduation, and match these counts with the counts of college applicants in the
administrative data.29 In each county-birth cohort-year of graduation cell, we
test whether the probability of applying to college is affected by exposure to
land reform.
Separate from estimation using the full sample, we also examine gender dif-
ference in the effect of exposure to land reform. In this exercise, possible changes
in sex ratio at birth following the reform is a concern. The increase in household
demand for manual labor would lead to a stronger desire for male labor if there
is a comparative advantage in physical work. Furthermore, old-age support in
rural areas was weakened following the collapse of the collective system, which
could also increase demand for boys. We use 1990 Census to test whether one’s
gender is endogenous to prenatal exposure to land reform.
2.5 Main results
2.5.1 Results
We report the estimated effects of in utero exposure to land reform on academic
performance, as captured by test scores in percentile and admission outcomes,
in Table 14. Exposure to land reform increases one’s total score by 0.25 per-
centile, which is statistically significant at 10 percent level. The effect size is
0.5 percent compared to the sample mean, a very small magnitude. Similar
effects are found on math and English scores, and the effect on math score is
slightly larger (a 0.6 percent increase) and statistically significant at 5 percent
29See Data Appendix on the construction of the cell size.
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level. While there is no strong evidence that land reform affects one’s chances
of going to college or a four-year college, test takers exposed to the reform are
2.8 percent more likely to be admitted by a first-tier college and 4.5 percent more
likely by a top 100 college, the latter of which is statistically significant at 1 per-
cent level. The larger effect on going to better colleges might suggest that ex-
posure to a positive income shock disproportionately benefits individuals with
better endowments in utero. Another possibility is that parents from higher so-
cioeconomic background invest more prenatally, or in childhood, or both, as
responses to an exogenous increase in household income.30
In Table 15, we report the results by gender. On test scores, while estimates
for female students are all statistically insignificant and small, male students
benefit from exposure to land reform in their total score, math score and En-
glish score. Particularly, the estimated effect on math score for boys is more
precise (statistically significant at the 1 percent level) and relatively larger in
magnitude (a 0.8 percent increase). We also find little effect of land reform on
admission outcomes for girls, except for a 3.5 percent increase in the probabil-
ity of going to a top-100 college at the 10 percent significant level. For exposed
boys, they are 4.5 percent more likely to be admitted by four-year colleges, and
5.5 percent more likely by top 100 colleges, which are larger effects compared to
these in the full sample. Moreover, they are 7 percent more likely to go to one of
the 39 elite colleges, the very top of the higher education pyramid, though the
estimate is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Overall, the positive
effect of prenatal exposure to land reform on performance on college entrance
exam largely loads on boys.
30Unfortunately, parental information is not available in the administrative data on test scores.
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2.5.2 Interpretation of gender difference
It is not obviouswhether the gender difference is purely biological or is involved
with gender discrimination in parental investments. If male fetuses are more
sensitive to the nutritional improvement induced by land reform, we would ex-
pect a lower fetal mortality rate for boys and thus a higher sex ratio after the
reform. In another paper, we find that the sex of the first child is not affected
by land reform, suggesting a minimal role of biology in explaining the gender
difference. Alternatively, in Model Appendix, we formalize two ideas for un-
derstanding the role of parental behaviors in the context of a society with son
preference. Following Almond and Currie (2011a), we consider that human
capital is produced in a two-period childhood. The shock in utero is the same
for boys and girls. As suggested by Chen et al., (2011), less than 20 percent
of all counties had introduced ultrasound by 1982, when more than 98 percent
had started land reform. Prenatal investments are therefore unlikely to respond
differentially to the shock for boys and for girls.
We first assume that the level of postnatal investment is always higher for
boys than for girls. For less than perfect substitution between periods, boys
benefit more from the shock in terms of later-life human capital. The difference
is generated mechanically by the gender discrimination in the investment level
in childhood, without assuming optimization.
Second, we consider responsive investments in childhood. Our departure
fromAlmond and Currie (2011a) is that we assume that parents value perceived
income of their child instead of child’s human capital, and the perceived return
to human capital is higher for boys than for girls. It is important to note that per-
ceived return could be different from actual earnings return to schooling in the
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labor market. Although the correlation between wage and years of schooling
is higher for women than for men in rural industries (Meng, 1998), rural par-
ents still desire higher education level for sons, who are expected to provide old
age support. In the 1991 Survey on Women’s Status in Contemporary China,
73 percent of rural women think that a son should have at least high school
education, while 54 percent think so for a daughter. The Chinese Longitudi-
nal Healthy Longevity Survey in 2005 shows that, the rural elderly rely more
on sons both financially and emotionally.31 We illustrate that, given a positive
shock in utero, parents respond more in postnatal investments for sons than for
daughters. Thus, the shock would have larger effect on improving academic
performance for boys.
Both interpretations are consistent with our reduced form evidence on the
gender difference. A final note is on the effect for girls. Regardless of gender
discrimination in parental investments, wemight still expect a positive effect for
girls through the biological channel. Estimates for girls have similar standard
errors but smaller point estimates relative to boys. Although these estimates
are imprecise, we can not reject certain positive effects for girls. Moreover, if
the production function is Leontieff in periods and the postnatal investment for
girls is zero, we would observe zero effect of prenatal exposure to land reform
for girls.
31Among rural individuals aged over 60 who live with children, 92% of them live with sons.
The financial transfer they get from sons is 1.7 times of that from daughters. When they are sick,
56% are taken care of by sons and daughter-in-laws, while only 9% by daughters and son-in-
laws. Moreover, for 66% of the elderly, the first person they talk to if they have difficulties is son
or daughter-in-law, while only 4% talk to daughter or son-in-law.
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2.6 Robustness
2.6.1 One Child Policy
There are 856 counties that report the timing of both land reform and OCP on
county gazetteers. If the introduction of OCP induced an increase in prenatal
investment of parents, we would expect that individuals in utero in the year
when OCP was introduced were the oldest cohort affected. Thus, we assign
treatment status to OCP as 1 for individuals born one year after OCP or later
and 0 otherwise.
In Table 16, we report the estimates for both exposure to land reform and ex-
posure to OCP. Recall that the sample of counties is smaller than our full sample
of counties. For estimates on test score in this smaller sample, only the estimate
for total score is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Despite less pre-
cise estimates, it is obvious that the estimate for exposure to land reform has
little change after exposure to OCP is controlled for. Results for admission out-
comes similar to that in the full sample. They are also robust when exposure to
OCP is controlled for. Table 17 and Table 18 report results for boys and girls,
respectively. Estimates for boys and girls are very similar to those using full
sample, and again they are robust to the inclusion of OCP.
These findings suggest little parental responses in the prenatal period to the
One Child Policy and that OCP does not confound our results for the effect of
land reform.
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2.6.2 Testing sample selection
This subsection reports results from testing possible concerns about sample se-
lection as discussed in Section 4.2. Using the 1990 Census, we first examine the
impact of land reform on the number of births at the county-birth year level.
A strength of using the 1990 Census is that internal migration had been under
strict control under the Hukou system by 1990.32 Our sample of counties in the
1990 Census are the same as those matched with the reform timing in the data
on test scores. In Table 19, we find no evidence of fertility response to land re-
form in column 1. The estimate on the number of births is -0.561, which is very
small, statistically insignificant, and has the opposite sign to the expectations.
In column 2 and 3, we test the sample selection into high school graduates.
We use the 2000 Census because individuals born between 1978 and 1984 were
at age 16-22 in 2000.33 There is suggestive evidence that in utero exposure in-
creases one’s probability of going to high school by 0.5 percentage points, a 3
percent increase relative to the sample mean. However, the estimate is not sta-
tistically different from zero. Consistent with the expectations, exposure to land
reform reduces high school dropout. The estimate is also very small and statis-
tically insignificant.
Next, column 4 showswhether a high school graduate’s decision to apply for
college is affected by his/her exposure to land reform. We conduct this test at
the county-birth year-year of application level by combining 1990 Census, 2000
32We merge the census data with the county-level data on the reform timing based on one’s
county of residence in 1990. Among individuals born between 1978 and 1984 who are at risk of
being test takers in our sample, only 0.73 percent of them were migrants.
33The 2000 Census is matched with the data on the land reform timing using one’s county of
residence in 2000. One caveat of using the 2000 Census is that migration rate has been rising
since the relaxation ofHukou system in the 1990s. Themigration rate is 8.4 percent in our sample.
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Census and the administrative data. The estimate is extremely small, a decrease
of 0.1 percentage points relative to the sample average of 39 percent. Again, it
is imprecisely estimated and with the wrong sign.
We report the result for testing the selection from applicants to test takers
in column 5. As expected, applicants exposed to land reform are less likely
to take the national exam, meaning that they are more likely to be guaranteed
admission. This is consistent with our finding on positive effect of exposure to
land reform on academic performance. However, the estimate is economically
very small and statistically insignificant.
To briefly summarize results from column 1 through 5, we find little evi-
dence that prenatal exposure to land reform affects one’s probability of being
observed in the sample of test takers in the college entrance exams, reducing
concerns about endogenous sample selection.
Further, for our results on gender difference, we use the 1990 Census and
report the estimate on whether gender is endogenous to land reform in column
6. Individuals born two years after land reform are 0.1 percentage points more
likely to be male, which is very small relative to the sample mean of 52 percent
and imprecisely estimated.
Lastly, recall the concern about one’s age at exam and the potential “bad con-
trol” problem as discussed in Section 4.1. In column 7, we use the administrative
data to examine the effect of exposure to land reform on one’s age at the college
entrance exams. Test takers exposed to land reform is 0.005 year (roughly 2
days) younger than those unexposed. The effect is economically small and sta-
tistically insignificant, suggesting that including year of exam effects would not
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yield to bias in our estimation.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we find that prenatal exposure to the 1978-84 land reform in
China has long-term impact on promoting human capital. Our findings sug-
gest that income might be beneficially targeted to the prenatal period and that
“pro-growth” policies can lay the foundation for human capital accumulation.
Moreover, boys benefit more from the reform. In the context of son preference,
we argue that the gender difference could be generated mechanically by differ-
ential investment level in childhood, or through differential parental responses
to the reform.
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CHAPTER 3
LAND REFORM ANDMISSING GIRLS IN CHINA
3.1 Introduction
Since Amartya Sen’s article More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing in 1990,
searching for the causes of missing girls has been the theme of numerous de-
bates. A recent consensus is that cultural and economic values of sons are the
primary driving forces in China, India and South Korea. Traditionally, parents
prefer sons. In China, for example, one of the core Confucian values is that
family lineage is traced solely through the male. Parents also need sons. In
a largely agricultural society with weak social security system, sons have the
physical strength for manual labor, and more importantly, they are expected
to provide old age support. Yet, design-based evidence separating economic
incentive from culture is still very thin.
This paper aims at isolating the economic cause of missing girls by explor-
ing the effect of the post-Mao land reform between 1978 and 1984 on sex ratio
in China. The collectivized system in Mao’s era was replaced by the Household
Responsibility System (HRS), under which collectively owned land was con-
tracted to individual households on a long-term basis. The institutional reform
had led to remarkable agricultural growth between 1978 and 1984 (McMillan
et al., 1989; Lin, 1992). During the same period, the sex ratio at birth also in-
creased dramatically in the rural areas (Zeng et al., 1993). Sen (1990) hypoth-
esizes that, the increase in household demand for manual labor and demand
for old age support following the reform provided parents incentive to select
for sons. Other than Sen’s hypotheses on institutional changes, it is also likely
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that the increase in household income induced by the reform led to more sex
selection, which became more affordable.
We use a research design that compares the sex of the second child between
families with a first girl and those with a first boy before and after the reform.
The validity of the triple-difference strategy comes from a number of facts.
One’s exposure to the reform depends his/her year of birth and county of birth,
where the reform timing varied from 1978 to 1984. We can compare births just
before and just after the reform. The third difference by the sex of the first child
is based on the demographical patterns found in Zeng et al., (1993). While the
sex ratio of the first child is biologically normal, it becomes abnormally male-
biased at higher birth orders, especially among families with no previous son.
Therefore, we focus on the second child in families with a first girl, where par-
ents have a stronger desire for sons. The second child in families with a first boy
is an ideal control group, because little human intervention is involved with the
sex of the first child. Finally, we are able to compile new data on the timing of
One Child Policy(OCP) implementation by county level and thus can directly
account for any potential confounding effect of OCP.
The main results show precisely estimated effect of land reform on driving
the rising sex ratio. The second child in families with a first girl is 5.5 percent
more likely to be a boy following land reform, and the increase in the county-
by-year sex ratio of the second child is 12 percent. Moreover, these effects are
robust when one’s exposure to OCP is controlled for.
To separate different hypotheses that might explain why land reform con-
tributed to the sex ratio imbalance, we provide evidence on three sets of het-
erogeneous effects. First, while we found significant increases in male births in
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counties that had positive productivity gain after the reform, no such increase
is observed where there was no post-reform agricultural growth. The distinct
effects by changes in productivity can rule out the hypothesis of demand for
old age support, which was induced by the universal collapse of collective sup-
port. Second, we find that the effect of land reform on male births does not vary
by the county-level fraction of women growing cash crops, which directly mea-
sures the local demand for female labor and increase in female income. This
suggests that the demand for labor is not gender specific and higher female
income does not lead to less sex selection. Alternatively, the hypothesis most
consistent with the evidence is the increase in total household income. Finally,
we document that better educated parents are more likely to have male births
after the reform, which supports that the increase in household income played
an important role in raising sex ratio.
The principle contribution of this paper is in the use of the post-Mao land
reform in China to provide new evidence on the role of economic incentive in
explainingmissing girls. It is also the first empirical evidence in support of Sen’s
argument that land reform led to higher sex ratio. On the other hand, evidence
on heterogeneous effects does not support Sen’s hypotheses that the increases
in demand for male labor and demand for old age support are the main mech-
anisms. Probably most strikingly, our evidence casts doubt on a common belief
that improving female income or female education saves girls.
We introduce the background of land reform, including the variation in the
reform timing and its first order effect on agricultural productivity, in Section
2. Section 3 provides the conceptual framework on why land reform might
led to higher sex ratio. We discuss data and identification strategy in Section
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4. Preliminary results are presented in Section 5. Results on robustness are
reported in Section 6.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 The post-Mao land reform
China had pursued collective agriculture for more than two decades since the
mid-1950s. Under this system, workers generally received daily fixed work
points and got paid at the end of the year (Lin, 1988). The incentive to work
was low and agricultural productivity was stagnant. From 1956 to 1977, there
had been virtually no change in grain output per capita (Zweig, 1987). Follow-
ing the death of Mao Zedong and the end of the Cultural Revolution, a decol-
lectivization reform was initiated in 1978. By contracting collectively owned
land to individual households on a long-term basis,1 the reform shifted the ba-
sic decision-making unit from the collective farm to the household. The new
system was called the Household Responsibility System (HRS), under which
individual households could make their own input decisions and receive all in-
come from the land after meeting the tax and quota sales obligations to the state
(Perkins, 1988; Sicular, 1991).
The HRS was initially worked out by farmers without approval from the
central government (Lin, 1987). At the end of 1978, a small number of pro-
duction teams in Anhui Province, which suffered from a severe drought in that
year, start to experiment with contracting land and output quotas to individual
1The earlier land lease was up to 15 years. It was extended to 30 years in 1993.
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households (Lin, 1987; Yang, 1996). The initial position of the Central Com-
mittee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on household farming was in a
strong opposition. The document “Regulations on the Management of Rural
People’s Commune” passed by the CCP in the November of 1978 clearly stipu-
lated that contracting to individual households was not permitted.
The prohibition was relaxed in September 1979 by allowing a few excep-
tions to households living in areas that were peripheral, distant, mountainous,
and isolated due to transportation difficulties.2 In September 1980, the Central
Document No.75 issued by the Central Committee further allowed poor and
remote areas and production units heavily dependent on state subsidies to con-
tract land and output quota to households. By August 1981, the Central Com-
mittee’s position on household farming became more liberalized in a mission
sent to fifteen provinces “contracting to households is not only a means of re-
lieving poverty but also ways of enhancing productivity; and it hasn’t changed
the production relations of the collective economy”.3 In January 1982, the Cen-
tral Document No.1 officially announced that “the HRS is the production re-
sponsibility system of the socialist economy”, which first showed the CCP’s
commitment to popularize HRS.
3.2.2 Variation on the reform timing
Data on the timing of land reform at the county level were previously undiscov-
ered. We have collected new data on the year HRS was introduced by county
from 1242 county gazetteers in which local history from 1949 to the 1980s was
2Agriculture Yearbook of China 1980, 1981, Beijing, Agricultural Press.
3People’s Daily, August 4th, 1981
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recorded. Specifically, it is the year when collectively owned land was first con-
tracted to individual households in a few villages of each county; and it usually
took 2-3 years to spread the HRS to the whole county. These counties represent
two-thirds of all counties that have ever published gazetteers.4 Because land
reform occurred in rural areas, our sample includes locations that were rural
counties at the time of the reform.5 In Figure 13, we plot the fraction of counties
that had introduced HRS between 1978 and 1984. Only 1.85 percent of coun-
ties were the reform pioneers in 1978. The vast majority reformed between 1979
and 1981, with the peak of 45 percent in 1980. By 1984, all counties had adopted
HRS.
To identify the effect of land reform using the variation in the reform timing,
the first priority is to understand what the driving forces were towards an ear-
lier reform. The evolution of the reform policies suggests two primary : drought
and poverty prior to the reform. A severe drought led to large declines in agri-
cultural production, which in turn provided the local government incentive to
reform.6 Particularly, the negative production shock spurred taking the political
risk as reform starters, since contracting land to individual households were not
permitted in earlier years. Poor and remote counties were among the first per-
mitted to adopt HRS by the central government as a means to reduce national
poverty rates.
Moreover, existing literature on HRS adoption at the province level provides
4The other one-third of counties do not report the timing of HRS adoption, or report it as
“the late 1970s” or “the early 1980s”, which are not useful for our identification strategy.
5City districts are defined and excluded by using the county code in the 1982 Census and the
official definition.
6Bai and Kung (2011) provide indirect evidence using province level data. They find that
provinces that suffered more in the 1959-61 Famine started land reform earlier when struck by
bad weather. The interpretation is that the Famine experience undermined the local belief that
collective farming could effectively cope with negative weather shocks.
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three additional insights (Lin, 1987; Yang, 1996; Chung, 2000). First, the diffu-
sion of HRS was faster where reduction in monitoring cost is higher and thus
productivity gains are larger. Using size of production team to measure mon-
itoring cost, previous studies show mixed findings.7 The second hypothesis is
that provinces that suffered more from the 1959-61 Famine reformed earlier, be-
cause the more painful the lesson from the Famine, the less likely the province
to favor collective farming. Supportive evidence is provided by Yang (1996)
and Bai and Kung (2011). Lastly, Yang (1996) argues that provinces further from
Beijing had more freedom to initiate earlier reform.
We first test whether drought had led to land reform bymatching the county-
level data on reform timing with county-by-year data on precipitation.8 Land
reform is an irreversible event, implying that drought prior to reform might
affect the decision to reform, but drought after would not. Thus, we assign
one to the first year of reform, zero before the first year and missing values
after. In addition, Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (1984) suggests
that, the growth of rice, the number one grain output in China, largely depends
on rainfall at the beginning of the growing season, usually in March or April.
In Table 10, column 1 shows no correlation between the first year of reform
and drought defined by average monthly precipitation in the whole growing
season (March to September) in the reform year and the year before.9 From
column 2 to 5, we measure drought by monthly precipitation from March to
June separately. As expected, droughts in March and April of the reform year
and one year before have strong and precisely estimated effect on motivating
7Lin (1987) finds that provinces with larger production teams reformed earlier, while Chung
(2000) has the opposite finding.
8See Data Appendix.
9Because the first month of reform are mostly not documented, a drought in the growing
season is likely to affect reform at the second half of the current year or next year.
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an earlier reform.
Next, to test the correlation between reform timing and other time-invariant
county characteristics as discussed above, we have collected and constructed
county-level measures prior to the reform from various sources. Poverty is
captured by grain output per capital in 1977 that are collected from county
gazetteers, and remoteness is measured by distance to province capital using
1982 Census. Size of production team is proxied by the density of labor force
(aged 16-60) in 1977.10 Famine intensity is measured by the average birth cohort
size in 1953-1957 divided by the average cohort size in 1959-1961 using the 1982
Census.11 We also calculate the distance to Beijing to capture freedom in local
policy-making. In Table 11, consistent with previous studies using provincial
variation, counties that were initially poor, that had larger production teams
in 1977 and higher famine intensity in 1959-1961, and further from the central
government decided to reform earlier. Controlling for grain output per capita
in 1977 forces us to drop two thirds of the sample due to lack of data. To get
close to the full sample with data on reform timing and explore the robustness,
we omit grain output in the last column and find robust results for labor force
density and famine intensity, though it decreases the standard error of distance
to Beijing that becomes statistically significant.12
In all regressions on the effect of land reform, we control for the time-variant
droughts in March and April in current year and the year before, as well as
time-invariant determinants of reform timing by county interacted with time
fixed effects.
10Density is calculated by population size aged 16-60 in 1977 divided by area at the county
level using 1982 Census.
11Meng et al. (2009) use a similar measure of famine intensity using the 1990 Census.
12Grain output per capita in 1977 is negatively correlated with distance to Beijing, and posi-
tively correlated with labor force density in 1977.
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3.2.3 Reform effect on productivity
By linking rewards directly to effort, the HRS provided economic incentives
to individual households (Sicular, 1991). The reform has been found to have
greatly improved agricultural productivity and increased rural household in-
come between 1978 and 1984. McMillan et al. (1989) suggest that over three-
quarters of the productivity increase during this period could be attributed to
the incentive effects of the HRS. Lin (1992) also finds provincial level evidence
that the reform accounts for half of the output growth. The reform is widely rec-
ognized for its achievements in lifting hundreds of millions of rural households
out of poverty (World Bank, 2000).13
Absent income data, it is useful to examine the effect of land reform on agri-
cultural output to understand income change after the reform. We collected the
year-by-year grain output data from county gazetteers and matched these data
with the reform timing data for 400 counties. In Table 20, we report the esti-
mated effect of land reform on grain output per capita. In column 1, on average,
HRS adoption increases grain output by 2.6 percent at the 10 percent significant
level. We further divide the sample by the change in grain output before and
after the reform. Interestingly, not every county benefited from the reform, and
the production growth concentrated in about half of these counties. Column 2
shows a precisely estimated increase of 9.2 percent in counties above median of
change in grain output at the 1 percent significant level, while column 3 shows
a 3.9 percent decrease at the 10 percent significant level in counties below the
median.
13Official estimates indicate that rural poverty rate declined from 30 percent in 1978 to 5 per-
cent in 1998 (World Bank, 2000).
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3.3 Hypotheses linking land reform to missing girls
Sen (1990) hypothesizes that, the rising sex ratio in rural China since 1979 could
be largely attributed to three institutional changes following land reform: the
collapse of collective medical system, increases in household demand for man-
ual labor and demand for sons as old age support. If the cutbacks in health
care supply had a pro-male effect, the effect would not depend on birth order
or the sex of the previous child. The first institutional change is therefore less
relevant for interpreting our empirical findings, while the other two changes are
expected to play important roles.
Different from Sen’s arguments on institutional changes, the third hypoth-
esis is that increase in household income induced by the reform might also af-
fect sex ratio, though the sign of the income effect is conceptually ambiguous.
Higher earning parents might rely less on sons for financial support and pos-
sibly have more savings in old age. On the other hand, the costly sex selection
became more affordable. Moreover, if the increase in demand for labor was
largely demand for male labor, we would expect larger income increase for men
than for women, which worsened women’s bargaining power and also made
girls less desirable.
Although the data do not allow us to directly test each hypothesis, evidence
on heterogeneous effects of land reform on sex ratio is helpful to disentangle
different explanations. One distinction between demand for old age support
and other hypotheses is that the weakened role of collective support would not
depend on post-reform agricultural productivity. Even if households were not
more productive on their own plots under the HRS, the collective no longer had
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public welfare funds to take care of old people. Thus, we can compare the effect
of land reform between counties with larger productivity grains and those with
smaller gains. If demand for old age support is the main motivation to select
sex, we would expect that the effect of land reform on male births does not vary
by changes in agricultural productivity.
We can also distinguish demand for gender-specific labor and increase in
gender-specific income from increase in total household income. If demand for
male labor and larger increase in male income contribute to the rising sex ratio,
we would expect a larger effect of land reform where the agricultural produc-
tion is moremale labor intensive. To relate our evidence to the existing literature
(Qian, 2008), we instead measure demand for female labor and female income
by the fraction of women growing cash crops by county. Our approach does not
rely on an assumption that a certain cash crop is gender specific. In the 1982
Census, 57 percent of workers growing cotton are women, 54 percent for veg-
etable, 42 percent for tea and 38 percent for fruit.14 The variation in the fraction
of female workers for all cash crops comes from the composition of cash crop
mix and how female labor intensive each crop is at the local level. If the increase
in sex ratio after land reform decreases with the fraction of female workers, it
is not possible to further separate demand for female labor from increase in fe-
male income in our data. Alternatively, if the reform effect is homogeneous, the
hypothesis most consistent with the evidence is that increase in total household
income led to more sex selection, regardless of who brought income home.
The income effect can be further explored by dividing the sample by parental
education. While there was no return to human capital in collectivized farm-
14In Qian (2008), one key assumption is that tea is picked mainly by women in China, which
contrasts with the facts that less than half of tea pickers are women, and the fraction is just 4
percentage points higher than that of fruit and far below that of the other two cash crops.
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ing, Yang and An (2002) find that education improves the uses of household-
supplied inputs and contributes to higher agricultural profit under the HRS.
If income effect is present, we would expect that better educated parents who
earned more in household production are more likely to have sons after the re-
form than their less educated counterparts. Moreover, as suggested by Edlund
(1999), if parents not only want sons but married sons, parents from higher so-
cioeconomic status would be the first movers to select for sons to avoidmarriage
market consequences of imbalanced sex ratio.
3.4 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 Data
The microdata we use is the publicly released 1 percent sample of the 1990 Cen-
sus. Our analysis focuses on rural areas which were defined as counties in the
1982 Census, the closest to the time of land reform. Census data in China do
not report county of birth, which forces us to use county of residence in 1990
to match the census data with the county-level data on reform timing. There
are 1065 counties (58 percent of all) that are matched with data on reform tim-
ing and county controls. Concerns about endogenous migration are minimal,
because internal migration had been under strict control under Hukou system
until its first relaxation in 1985 (Wang, 2005).
Our research design needs information on one’s birth order and sex of pre-
vious children, which are not directly reported in the census data. The only
question to identify one’s position within a household is his/her relationship
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to the household head. Therefore, we focus on children of the household head.
Our main analysis sample of second births is constructed as follows. First, we
require that the number of children linked to the househead is equal to the to-
tal number of births reported by their mother (spouse of household head or
household head herself). Families where older children were always in 1990 are
excluded. Second, we exclude families with multiple births, where birth order
is more difficult to identify. Third, using information on each child’s year and
month of birth, we define one’s birth order as well as the sex of the previous
child. Finally, we restrict the sample of second births to children born in 1974
and 1986. The oldest cohort were 16 in 1990, who were unlikely to be away from
home of parents, and were also more likely to be matched with the first child.
For the analysis by parental education, we further restrict the sample to children
in two-parent families.
In our sample of births, one is defined as migrant if he/she did not reside
in the same county in 1985, which is reported in the census. The migration
rate among individuals born in 1974-84 is as low as 0.63 percent. Thoughout
our analysis, we use the 99.37 percent born in 1974-84 who resided in the same
county in 1985 and all births in 1985-86.
Summary statistics of the full sample and the sample in two-parents families
are reported in Table 21.
3.4.2 Empirical Strategy
We estimate the effect of exposure to land reform on the probability of being
male for the second births using a triple-difference strategy. The first double
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differences are among birth cohorts and between counties that reformed earlier
and those that reformed later, which jointly define the pre- and post-reform co-
horts. The third difference is between families with a first girl and those with a
first boy, as suggested by Zeng et al., (1993) that the sex ratio is most male-biased
among births at higher birth orders in families with no previous son. Consider
the estimation equation:
Boy2i jt = α+β1Post jt+β2Girl
1
i jt+β3Post jt∗Girl1i jt+γ j+δt+φ j∗t+D￿jtθt+D￿jt−1λt−1+
1986￿
t=1975
(X￿j∗Tt)ρt+εi jt
(3.1)
where the subscript i denotes the individual, j the county of birth, and t the
year of birth. The superscript denotes birth order, 1 the first child and 2 the
second. The dependent variable, Boyi jt, is a binary outcome that is equal to 1 if
the second child is a boy and 0 otherwise. The reform indicator Post jt is equal
to 1 if the child is born one year after the reform and 0 otherwise, which is
determined by one’s year of birth and county of birth. Girl1i jt is an indicator that
is equal to 1 if the first child is a girl and 0 otherwise. We interact the reform
indicator with sex of the first child to get the regressor of interest, Post jt ∗Girl1i jt.
To tease out possibly confounding differences among birth cohorts and be-
tween reform starters and followers, a comprehensive set of controls are in-
cluded in the estimation. County fixed effects γ j and year of birth effects δt
absorb the effects of time invariant county characteristics and birth cohort ef-
fects. County specific linear trends, φ j ∗ t, account for county characteristics that
change smoothly over time and that are correlated with the reform timing. Fur-
thermore, we account for time varying effects of county characteristics that are
found to drive the reform timing. Droughts in March and April of the current
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year are denoted by D￿jt, and droughts of last year are denoted by D
￿
jt−1. The
time-invariant determinants of the reform timing, X￿j, including labor force den-
sity in 1977, famine intensity in 1959-61 and distance to Beijing, are interacted
with time fixed effects from 1975 to 1986, with 1974 omitted.
The coefficient of interest, β3, measures the effect of land reform on second
child beingmale in families with a first girl relative to that in families with a first
boy. Two identifying assumptions are crucial in this triple-difference strategy.
The second births in families with no previous son provide the right counterfac-
tual. Moreover, there are no unobserved changes coincident with land reform
by county and year that have differential effects on the sex of the second child
depending on the sex of the first child.
The validity of the first assumption requires that the sex of the first child is
not endogenous to the reform, and the change in the sex of the second child
among the pre-reform cohorts does not differ by the sex of the first one. As
noted in the introduction, Zeng et al., (1993) documents that the sex ratio of
the first births is biologically normal. To be cautious, we directly test whether
the reform affected the sex of the first child and fail to find an effect. We also
provide transparent evidence of no pre-existing trends in the sex ratio of the
second births for both families with a previous son and those without.
For the second identifying assumption, the potential threats come from other
reforms during the same period. To confound the effects of land reform, other
reforms should have followed the timing of land reform closely at the county
level and have had differential impacts on the sex of the second child for families
with a previous son and those without. We have conducted a comprehensive
reading on reform policies from the late 1970s to the early 1980s and grouped
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them into three categories. The first type includes reforms that might lead to
stronger desires for sons among parents with a first girl, but that were intro-
duced in the same year nationwide. Typical examples are the price reform and
market reform that camewith land reform as a whole package of rural economic
reforms. The increases in procurement prices and in bonuses for above-quota
productions were in 1979 (Sicular, 1991),15 and the reductions in the planning of
agricultural production and in the restrictions in interregional trade were also
universal state interventions (Lin, 1992). Any effects of exposure to reforms in
this category are accounted for by controlling for year of birth effects δt.
Another type of reforms were introduced at different time during the same
period, but their effect on the sex of the second child (if any) does not depend
on the sex of the first one. As discussed in Section 3, the crisis in health care
supply following land reform belongs to this category. We difference out pos-
sibly time-invariant effect of these reforms by controlling for the sex of the first
child. Moreover, we provide evidence below that the sex ratio of the second
child in families with a first boy remains constant before and after the reform,
suggesting no sign for an effect of this type of reforms.
The One Child Policy (OCP) stands out as the most likely confounder that
was introduced closely to land reform and was enforced by county at different
time, and more relevantly, it is found to have led to rising sex ratio, especially
at higher birth orders in families with no previous son (Ebenstein, 2010). To di-
rectly test whether the OCP has accounted for any effect of land reform, we have
collected data on the timing of OCP implementation by county to directly dis-
entangle the effects of these two reforms. In Figure 14, we plot the distribution
of the timing of land reform and OCP. While they were both introduced from
15Qian (2008) identified the effect of the price reform on tea versus fruit on sex ratio.
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the late 1970s to the mid 1980s, there is substantial difference in their rollout at
the county level. Thus, we are able to disentangle the effect of one reform from
that of the other, if any.
3.5 Preliminary results
3.5.1 Main effect
We begin by plotting the sex ratio of first child by birth year relative to reform
year, in Figure 15. The sex ratio is very stable at the biologically normal rate of
1.05 before and after the reform. In column 1 of Table 22, the estimate of land
reform on the sex of first child is very small (a 0.6 percent increase relative to
sample mean) and statistically insignificant, which supports our use of families
with a first boy as control group.
Figure 16 shows sex ratio of the second child for families with a first girl and
those with a first boy separately. Once again, little change in the sex ratio for
families with a first boy in the pre- and post- reform periods demonstrates the
validity of our research design. Interestingly, the two primary causes of missing
girls, cultural and economic values of sons, are both visible from the figure.
Among the pre-reform cohorts, while no pre-existing trend is observed for both
groups, the sex ratio of second child in families with a first girl is constantly
higher than that in families with a first boy by more than 10 percentage points.
This illustrates son preference as a culture, that is, parents with no previous son
always have stronger desire for a son. Starting from one year after the reform,
the sex ratio in families with a first girl increases dramatically, from around 1.15
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to the peak of 1.3 in six years after the reform, while the ratio in families with a
first boy remains nearly constant. The sharp contrast between these two groups
in the pre- and post periods supports the effect of land reform as a source of
economic incentives on raising sex ratio.
Column 2 presents the estimate for the effect of land reform on second child
being male at the individual level. We find an increase in the probability of
being male by 2.9 percentage points among families with a first girl relative to
families with a first boy, and it is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
The effect is sizable in magnitude, around 5.5 percent relative to the sample
mean for all second births. Furthermore, it is slightly larger than the effect of
son preference, as captured by the indicator of having a first girl, which is an
increase of 2.7 percentage points. To translate the effect of land reform on male
births to the effect on sex ratio, we also estimate equation (1) on sex ratio of
second births by county and birth year. In column 3, sex ratio in families with
a first girl increases by 0.15 following the reform, a precisely estimated increase
of 12 percent and consistent with the visual impression from Figure 16.
Overall, our findings provide the first empirical evidence that the 1978-84
land reform is an important driving force of the rising sex ratio in rural China.
3.5.2 Heterogeneous effects
Nowwe turn to evidence on three sets of heterogeneous effects for understand-
ing the pathways through which land reform raised the sex ratio of the second
births.
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We first test whether the effect of land reform on second child being male
varies by the post-reform increase in productivity. In Table 23, we present the
estimated effects in the subsample of 400 counties that report grain output data.
Before dividing the sample by the change in grain output per capita before and
after the reform, we estimate the overall effect in this subsample. In column 1,
the magnitude of the increase in the probability of being male, 1.3 percentage
points, is smaller than that in our full sample, and it is also less precisely esti-
mated. This indicates that we could underestimate the effect on male births us-
ing this subsample. Nevertheless, this sample provides the unique opportunity
to explore the treatment heterogeneity by changes in productivity. Column 2
shows a precisely estimated increase of 2.7 percentage points for counties above
the median of the change in grain output, which doubles the overall effect in
column 1. In contrast, the estimate in column 3 for counties below the median is
very small in magnitude and not statistically different from zero, and has neg-
ative sign. Recall that only counties above the median experienced an increase
in grain output after the reform. Putting it all together, these findings suggest
larger effect of land reform on sex ratio in areas with larger productivity grain
induced by the reform. As discussed in Section 3, this implies that the collapse
of collective support for the elderly after the reform, which does not depend on
the change in grain output, is unlikely to play the main role.
Next, if the increase in sex ratio is mainly caused by demand for male labor
and increase in male income, wewould expect that the increase is smaller where
the agricultural production is more female labor intensive. In Table 24, however,
we fail to find evidence of any heterogeneous effect by the county-level fraction
of female workers in growing cash crops. The estimate for the interacted effect
of post-reform, first being a girl and the fraction of female workers is econom-
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ically very small, a decrease of -0.02 percentage points, suggesting that a 10
percent increase in the fraction of female workers leads to a 0.2 percent decline
in the probability of second child being male. It is also statistically insignificant.
This estimate provides two important implications. The demand for labor after
the reform is not gender specific. In addition, higher female income does not
lead to less sex selection. Alternatively, that increase in total household income
is the primary cause of rising sex ratio is most consistent with our evidence.
Finally, we test whether better educated parents respond to land reform dif-
ferently compared to less educated ones. In Panel A of Table 25, we find that
mothers with higher education levels are more likely to have a second son af-
ter the reform, and the difference increases with education level. All the es-
timates are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The largest effect is
found among mothers with a high school education, who are 6.5 percentage
points more likely to have a second son than those without. Similarly results
for fathers are presented in Panel B, though the differences between better edu-
cated fathers and less educated ones are smaller than those for mothers. These
findings again support the explanation of increase in total household income,
because better educated parents might have earned more after the reform. They
are also consistent with the prediction in Edlund (1999) that parents from higher
status respond first to select for married sons. On the other hand, probably most
strikingly, as income increases, better educated women not only have stronger
desire for sons, but have even stronger desire than better educated men. Absent
evidence on gender difference in return to education in agricultural production
at that time, it is unclear whether it is because educated women contribute more
to household income, or because the marginal increase in son preference as in-
come increase is larger for women. Either interpretation is in contrast with the
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belief that improving female education or income save girls.
3.6 Robustness
3.6.1 One Child Policy
There are 856 counties that report the timing of both land reform and OCP on
county gazetteers. We assign the exposure status to OCP as 1 if one was born
one after the introduction of OCP in his/her county of birth and 0 otherwise.
In Panel A of Table 26, both land reform and OCP have little effect on the sex
of the first child. In Panel B, column 1 shows similar estimates for land reform
as in the full sample. In column 2, we find that the second birth in families with
a first girl is 2.4 percentage more likely to be male after the introduction of OCP,
which is precisely estimated. When we control for both land reform and OCP in
column 3, the estimate for land reform is very robust, while estimates for OCP
become much smaller and statistically insignificant. These results suggest that
the effect of land reform is not confounded by OCP. Moreover, they cast doubt
on a common argument that OCP leads to higher sex ratio, which, however,
could be confounded by land reform.
3.6.2 Fertility
Land reform may increase the desire to have more children because the land
distribution is based on family size, while OCP would decrease fertility. We
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first estimate the effect of land reform andOCP on total fertility. Consistent with
expectations, Panel A of Table 27 shows that the number of births by county and
year is increased by 2 percent by land reform, and it is decreased by 2 percent
by OCP.
If the increased fertility after land reform concentrates in the second birth,
our sample would be a selected one. However, the rule of land distribution
only applies to authorized birth (the single child), implying that the margin of
fertility affected by land reform would be most likely from zero to one. On the
other hand, the effect of OCP would be on a different margin, that is, fewer
second births. To test whether land reform affects the decision to have a second
child, we use the year of birth of the first child and the stable birth interval to as-
sign treatment status. Specifically, since 3-year is the common interval between
the first and second child at that time, we assign 1 to the first child born 2 years
before land reform or later and 0 otherwise. In Panel B, controlling for OCP,
the effect of land reform on having a second child is very small and statistically
insignificant. Interestingly, the effect on having a second child all loads to OCP,
that is, OCP increases the probability of having a second child, but parents with
a first girl are still more likely to have a second one after OCP.
Overall, these findings suggest that, on the margin of fertility response most
relevant to our identification, we do not find an effect of land reform.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide design-based evidence that the 1978-84 land reforms
is an important driving force of the sex ratio imbalance in China. The second
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child in families with a first girl is 5.5 percent more likely to be a boy follow-
ing the reform relative to that in families with a first boy, which leads a 12
percent increase in the sex ratio among the second child. The effect is larger
where the post-reform increase in agricultural productivity is larger, but it does
not vary by demand for gender-specific labor or increase in gender-specific in-
come. Probably most strikingly, better educated parents with no previous son
are more likely to have male births after the reform. Our findings suggest that
the increase in total household income induced by the reform led to more sex
selection.
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APPENDIX A
MODEL APPENDIX
A. Mechanical difference
Following Almond and Currie (2011a), we consider a simple two-period child-
hood. Human capital h at the completion of childhood is produced with a CES
technology:
h = A[γ(I¯1 + µg)φ + (1 − γ)Iφ2 ]
1
φ , (A.1)
where I1 denotes investment in the first period of childhood (in utero in our
context), and I2 denotes investment in the second period (postnatal period). An
exogenous shock to (predetermined) period 1 investment is denoted by µg. Be-
cause ultrasound technology had been largely unavailable, for simplicity, we
assume that prenatal investment is fixed.
In the presence of son preference, we assume that the investment level in
period 2 is higher for boys than for girls, that is, I(b)2 > I
(g)
2 , and parental invest-
ments in period 2 do not respond to the shock. The sign of the gender difference
in human capital as response to the shock depends on φ. For φ < 1, the shock
has a larger effect in promoting human capital for boys than for girls.
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B. Optimization
Nowwe consider parental responses to the shock. Parents value their consump-
tion C and perceived income of their child yc:
Up = U(C, yc) = B[θCϕ + (1 − θ)yϕc ]
1
ϕ , (A.2)
where yc = mh for boys and yc = nh for girls. We assume that the perceived
return to human capital is higher for boys than for girls, that is, m > n. We also
assume that parents view child as consumption instead of investment, i.e. they
do not borrow against. Their budget constraint is:
I¯1 + I2 +C = y¯p. (A.3)
Let’s consider boys first. Absent discounting, the marginal utility from con-
suming equals the marginal utility from investing:
δU
δC
=
δU
δyc
δyc
δI∗2
(A.4)
θ(y¯p − I¯1 − I∗2)ϕ−1 = (1 − θ)(mh)ϕ−1mA[...]
1
φ−1(1 − γ)I∗φ−12 (A.5)
θ(y¯p − I¯1 − I∗2)ϕ−1 = mϕ(1 − θ)(1 − γ)Aϕ[...]
ϕ−φ
φ I∗φ−12 (A.6)
G(I∗2, µg) = θ(y¯p − I¯1 − I∗2)ϕ−1 − mϕ(1 − θ)(1 − γ)Aϕ[...]
ϕ−φ
φ I∗φ−12 = 0 (A.7)
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δI∗2
δµg
= −
δG
δµg
δG
δI∗2
=
mϕ(1 − θ)(1 − γ)Aϕ(ϕ − φ)[...] ϕ−2φφ I∗φ−12 γ(I¯1 + µg)φ−1
θ(1 − ϕ)(y¯p − I¯1 − I∗2)ϕ−2 + mϕAϕ(1 − θ)(1 − γ)[...]
ϕ−φ
φ I∗φ−22
￿
(1 − φ) − (ϕ − φ)(1 − γ)I∗φ2 [...]−1
￿ .
(A.8)
We define B to be (1 − θ)(1 − γ)Aϕ(ϕ − φ)[...] ϕ−2φφ I∗φ−12 γ(I¯1 + µg)φ−1,
C to be θ(1 − ϕ)(yp − I¯1 − I∗2)ϕ−2 ≥ 0,
and D to be Aϕ(1 − θ)(1 − γ)[...] ϕ−φφ I∗φ−22
￿
(1 − φ) − (ϕ − φ)(1 − γ)I∗φ2 [...]−1
￿
.
Equation (15) is simplified as:
δI∗2
δµg
=
mϕB
C + mϕD
. (A.9)
For φ < ϕ, B > 0. Define the component in bracket of D to be E: (1 − φ) − (ϕ −
φ)(1 − γ)I∗φ2 [...]−1, and
(1 − φ) − (ϕ − φ)(1 − γ)I
∗φ
2
[...]
=
(1 − φ)γ(I¯1 + µg)φ + (1 − γ)(1 − ϕ)I∗φ2
[...]
(A.10)
For φ < 1, E > 0, and thus D > 0. (17) is positive so that positive shocks in
period 1 should be reinforced. Next, we compare (16) for boys and for girls:
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δI(b)∗2
δµg
− δI
(g)∗
2
δµg
=
(mϕ − nϕ)BC
(C + mϕD)(C + nϕD)
. (A.11)
For m > n, (18) is positive, suggesting that parents invest more on boys than
on girls as response to the shock. Finally, consider the impact of the shock on
later-life human capital for boys and for girls separately:
δh(b)
δµg
= A[...](b)
1
φ−1γ(I¯1 + µg)φ−1 +
δh(b)
δI(b)∗2
δI(b)∗2
δµg
(A.12)
δh(g)
δµg
= A[...](g)
1
φ−1γ(I¯1 + µg)φ−1 +
δh(g)
δI(g)∗2
δI(g)∗2
δµg
(A.13)
For φ < 1, A[...](b)
1
φ−1γ(I¯1+µg)φ−1 > A[...](g)
1
φ−1γ(I¯1+µg)φ−1, and δ
2h
δI22
> 0. Therefore,
(19) > (20).
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APPENDIX B
DATA APPENDIX
A. Precipitation data
We use the Global Surface Summary of Day Data produced by National Cli-
mate Data Center (NCDC). Throughout China, daily data on total precipitation
amount (0.01 inches) are available from 225 weather stations from 1956 to 1964
and 536 stations from 1973 to 1984. In each year, we assign each county in the
1982 Census the precipitation data from the nearest weather station using longi-
tude and latitude. Because the number of weather stations increases overtime,
a county might be assigned different stations in different years, with relatively
closer stations in more recent years.
To construct the measure of drought in March, for example, we first get the
distribution of total precipitation in March from all years during 1956-1964 and
1973-1984 for each county. We then define drought inMarch as a binary variable
that is equal to 1 if the monthly precipitation is below the bottom 20 percentile
of the distribution for each county in each year and 0 otherwise. For drought in
the whole growing season, we calculate the average monthly precipitation from
March to September and use its distribution to define drought.
B. Construct size of high school graduates in census data
We first count the number of births born between 1978 and 1984 by county and
year of birth in the 1990 Census. A strength of using the 1990 Census for cohort
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size is that internal migration was still under strict control in 1990. We use the
2000 Census to calculate the fraction of population that ever went to high school
or still in high school by county and year of birth. By matching cells in the 1990
and 2000 Census, we get the counts of high school students in each county-birth
year cell in the 1990 Census.
Next, to match with the administrative data at the county-birth year-year of
application level, we also need to further narrow down the cell in the 1990 Cen-
sus by county, birth year and year of graduation. However, we do not observe
year of graduation in any census data. Instead, we assume the age distribution
in college entrance exams during 1999-2001 is the same as that of high school
graduates who were born in 1978-1984. We calculate the fraction of applicants
at a certain age (from 17 to 21) from the administrative data by county, and as-
sign the fraction to each cell in the 1990 Census by county and year of birth. We
then use this fraction as the probability of graduating at a certain age in each
county-birth year cell, and get the size of county-birth year-year of graduation
cell in the 1990 Census.
Lastly, we take the count of applicants by county, birth year and year of
application in the administrative data and match with the count of high school
graduates by county, birth year and year of graduation in the 1990 Census. We
divide the cell size of applicants by the cell size of high school graduates, and
get the probability of applying for college in each cell.
A final note is that we use the sample of first-time applicants (70%) in the
administrative data for this test. Because we do not observe whether one repeat
the last year in high school in census data, we only observe the cell size of high
school graduates assuming that they graduate once. What we are concerned
97
about is whether the decision of a high school graduate to ever apply for college
is endogenous to land reform, which can be test using the probability of first-
time
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Figure B.1: Supply of high schools - total number of high schools in coun-
ties
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Figure B.2: Distribution of the first year of the school closures: 1977-1984
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Figure B.3: Distribution of the timing of school closures
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Figure B.4: Motherhood observed
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Figure B.5: Maternal age at first birth
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Figure B.6: High school completion
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Figure B.7: Gestational age
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Figure B.8: Prematurity
.0
1
.0
15
.0
2
.0
25
.0
3
.0
35
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 p
re
m
at
ur
e 
bir
th
s (
<9
 m
on
th
s)
23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12
age in quarter by the first quarter in the first year of school closure
112
Figure B.9: Neonatal mortality rate
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Figure B.10: Infant mortality rate
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Figure B.11: Birth weight
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Figure B.12: Low birth weight
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Figure B.13: Land reform timing
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Figure B.14: Timing of land reform vs. One Child Policy
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Figure B.15: Sex ratio of the first child
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Figure B.16: Sex ratio of the second child
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Table B.1: Summary Statistics
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Table B.2: Reduced form on fertility choices
(1) (2)
Motherhood observed=1 Had the 1st birth under 18=1
-0.0067 -0.0043
[0.0054] [0.0035]
0.92 0.012
66383 61059
0.139 0.057
13 0.0002 21 0.0329*** 29 -0.0038
[0.0002] [0.0105] [0.0031]
14 0.0003 22 -0.0249** 30 0.0008
[0.0006] [0.0108] [0.0016]
15 -0.0013* 23 0.0037 31 -0.0020*
[0.0007] [0.0100] [0.0012]
16 0.0020 24 -0.0061 32 -0.0013*
[0.0013] [0.0094] [0.0008]
17 -0.0039* 25 -0.0045 33 -0.0003
[0.0021] [0.0081] [0.0004]
18 -0.0043 26 -0.0013 34 0.00002
[0.0035] [0.0065] [0.0002]
19 0.0072 27 -0.0036 35 -0.0003*
[0.0059] [0.0048] [0.0002]
20 0.0120 28 -0.0012 36 -0.0002
[0.0074] [0.0030] [0.0001]
sample mean
Observation
Panel A: Selection into motherhood and teenage pregnancy
R-squared
Panel B: Maternal age at first birth
Dependent variable: Each specific maternal age at first birth
22.7
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at county level are reported in brackets. The sample in column (1) of Panel A 
includes women at age 12-23 by the first quarter in the first year of school closure, while the sample in column (2) of 
Panel A and Panel B includes the same cohorts of mothers. In Panel B, each dependend variable is an indicator for a 
specific maternal age at first birth, and each parameter is from a separate regression on a specific maternal age. All 
regressions include a quadratic cohort trend and its interaction with the indicator of at or younger than age 17.75 by the 
school closure, quarter of birth effects, county fixed effects and county specific quadratic trend.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
61059
Observations
1{age at school closure=<17.75}
Dependend variable mean
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Table B.3: First stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1{age at school closure=<17.75} -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.036***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
Linear cohort trend X X X X X X X X
QOB FE X X X X X X
County FE X X X X
County specific linear trend X X
Dependent variable mean at age 18
Dependent variable mean
Observations 61059 61059 61059 61059 22444 22444 22444 22444
R-squared 0.009 0.009 0.049 0.069 0.012 0.012 0.074 0.114
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at county level are reported in brackets. This table reports the first stage estimates, !1, in equation 
(2). The dependend variable is an indicator that is equal to 1 if one completed high school, and 0 otherwise. The sample of mothers 
includes those at age 12-23 by the first quarter in the first year of school closure. The sample in column (1)-(4) include all mothers, while 
the sample in column (5)-(8) include mothers that report the birth weight of their first birth.
High school completion
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   
Birth weight sample
0.0950.073
All mother sample
0.12 0.16
Table B.4: OLS, Reduced form and IV estimation
Gestational age 
(in months) Prematurity
Mortality in 
1 month
Mortality in 
1 year
Birth weight 
(in grams)
Low 
birthweight
high school completion -0.0016 0.0019 -0.0025 -0.0039** 57.3776*** -0.0097**
[0.0058] [0.0024] [0.0016] [0.0019] [12.1532] [0.0040]
Observations 61047 61059 58329 58329 22444 22444
R-squared 0.547 0.035 0.016 0.020 0.147 0.052
1{age at school closure=<17.75} -0.009 0.003 -0.0018 -0.0016 -10.35 -0.004
[0.007] [0.003] [0.0022] [0.0026] [14.59] [0.005]
Observations 61,047 61,047 58,329 58,329 22444 22444
R-squared 0.554 0.048 0.033 0.035 0.183 0.089
high school completion 0.334 -0.093 0.070 0.065 246.29 0.135
[0.244] [0.092] [0.087] [0.100] [380.36] [0.144]
Dependent variable mean 9.3 0.022 0.014 0.02 3299 0.037
Observations 61,047 61,047 58,329 58,329 22,444 22,444
F statistic in first stage 28.35 28.49 23.77 23.77 14.09 14.09
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at county level are reported in brackets. Panel A reports OLS estimates, with maternal age, 
county fixed effects and mother's year of birth effects controlled for. Panel B reports the reduced form estimates, !2, in equation (3). 
Panel B reports IV estimates on the effects of mother's high school education on infant health outcomes. The instrument variable in 
Panel C is the indicator variable of being at age 17.75 or younger by the first quarter in the first year of school closure. Each 
parameter is from a separate regression on one outcome. The sample of mothers includes those at age 12-23 by the first quarter in 
the first year of school closure. Regressions in Panel B and C include a linear cohort trend and its interaction with the indicator of 
being at age 17.75 or younger, quarter of birth effects, county fixed effects and county specific linear trends.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Panel C: IV estimation
Panel B: Reduced form
Panel A: OLS
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Table B.5: Other relevant outcomes (1992 CCS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
working
off-farm 
employment
white-collar 
jobs
any prenatal 
check
prenatal 
check in the 
1st trimester
delivered 
at hospital
1{age at school closure=<17.75} 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001
[0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.009] [0.006] [0.007]
Observations 61059 54831 54831 59752 59752 58300
R-squared 0.419 0.224 0.067 0.254 0.161 0.257
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Labor market outcomes Prenatal care and delivery
Reduced form
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at county level are reported in brackets. This table reports reduced form estimates on 
the effects of maternal exposure to the school closures on other outcomes. Each parameter is from a separate regression on 
one outcome. The sample of mothers includes those at age 12-23 by the first quarter in the first year of school closure. All 
regressions include a linear cohort trend and its interaction with the indicator of at or younger than age 17.75 by the school 
closure, quarter of birth effects, county fixed effects and county specific linear trend.
Table B.6: Paternal characteristics (1990 Census)
First stage
wife
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
high school 
completion
high school 
completion working
off-farm 
employment
white-collar 
jobs
1{wife's age at school closure=<17.75} -0.025*** -0.013*** 0.001 0.003 -0.001
[0.004] [0.005] [0.001] [0.004] [0.002]
Observations 145110 145110 145110 144801 144801
R-squared 0.069 0.058 0.009 0.188 0.041
Reduced form
husband
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at county level are reported in brackets. Using the sample of the same 400 
counties in the 1990 Census, this table reports first stage estimate for women and reduced form estimates on their 
husbands' education and labor market outcomes. Each parameter is from a separate regression on one outcome. The 
sample of women includes those at age 12-23 by the first quarter in the first year of school closure. All regressions 
include a linear cohort trend and its interaction with the indicator of at or younger than age 17.75 by the school closure, 
quarter of birth effects, county fixed effects and county specific linear trend.
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Table B.7: Test the continuity of predetermined characteristics
middle school 
completion
high school 
completion
age at 
birth
middle school 
completion
high school 
completion parity
months of 
breastfeeding
mortality in 1 
month
mortality in 
1 year
1{born in Q2 or after} -0.009 0.003 0.066 0.011 -0.005 -0.015 -0.276 0.003 -0.001
[0.007] [0.004] [0.110] [0.016] [0.009] [0.037] [0.334] [0.008] [0.011]
Dependent variable mean 0.05 0.01 24.4 0.2 0.06 2.15 15.04 0.044 0.094
Observations 103696 103696 103696 87954 87954 103682 103695 103696 103696
R-squared 0.189 0.205 0.252 0.205 0.200 0.157 0.134 0.072 0.092
1{born in Q2 or after} 0.002 0.002 -0.117 0.003 0.004 -0.054 0.226 -0.017** -0.029**
[0.008] [0.004] [0.124] [0.015] [0.009] -0.055 [0.357] [0.009] [0.012]
Dependent variable mean 0.05 0.01 24.6 0.2 0.06 2.17 15.04 0.044 0.093
Observations 99349 99349 99349 84401 84401 99336 99348 99349 99349
R-squared 0.196 0.215 0.229 0.208 0.204 0.150 0.137 0.073 0.093
1{born in Q2 or after} 0.006 -0.001 0.088 -0.022* -0.005 -0.017 0.348 -0.005 0.005
[0.006] [0.003] [0.106] [0.012] [0.008] [0.037] [0.249] [0.007] [0.009]
Dependent variable mean 0.05 0.01 24.7 0.2 0.06 2.2 15.04 0.043 0.093
Observations 94323 94323 94323 80237 80237 94310 94322 94323 94323
R-squared 0.200 0.218 0.208 0.209 0.209 0.144 0.140 0.076 0.096
1{born in Q2 or after} 0.010 0.000 -0.028 0.007 0.003 0.000 0.320 0.007 0.004
[0.006] [0.003] [0.100] [0.011] [0.006] [0.033] [0.227] [0.005] [0.008]
Dependent variable mean 0.05 0.01 25 0.2 0.06 2.24 15.02 0.043 0.091
Observations 88562 88562 88562 75470 75470 88550 88561 88562 88562
R-squared 0.206 0.229 0.188 0.213 0.217 0.141 0.141 0.079 0.099
Panel C: 1962
Panel D: 1963
Note: Robust standard error clustered at county level are reported in brackets.This table reports estimates on the mean shift of the dependent variable at being born at 
the second quarter or after for each year from 1960 to 1963. For each year, the sample includes rural female births born 24 quarters before and 24 quarters after the 
second quarter of that particular year. All regressions include a quadratic cohort trend and its interaction with the indicator of being borning in the second quarter or after 
for that year (1960-1963), quarter of birth fixed effects, year of birth fixed effects, county fixed effects and county specific quadratic trend. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Grandparental characteristics
Women characteristicsgrandmother grandfather
Panel A: 1960
Panel B: 1961
Table B.8: First and reduced form including one’s exposure to the land re-
form
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
1{age at school closure=<17.75} -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.015** -0.016** 0.006* 0.005* -0.003 -0.004
[0.006] [0.005] [0.0074] [0.008] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
1{age at land reform=<17.75} -0.002 0.004 0.002 0.003
[0.006] [0.009] [0.003] [0.003]
Observations 47553 47553 47543 47543 47543 47543 45311 45311
R-squared 0.069 0.069 0.533 0.533 0.048 0.048 0.033 0.033
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
1{age at school closure=<17.75} -0.003 -0.004 -9.38 -16.99 -0.003 0.0002
[0.003] [0.003] [17.65] [18.28] [0.007] [0.007]
1{age at land reform=<17.75} 0.005 23.99 -0.01
[0.003] [21.35] [0.008]
Observations 45311 45311 16573 16573 16573 16573
R-squared 0.035 0.035 0.176 0.176 0.090 0.090
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at county level are reported in brackets. Using 306 counties that have timing information on both high 
school closure and land reform, this table reports estimates of both the first stage and the reduced form on infant health outcomes. The sample of 
mothers include those at age 12-23 by the first quarter in the first year of school closure. All column (1) control for a linear cohort trend and its 
interaction with the indicator of at or younger than age 17.75 by the school closure, quarter of birth effects, county fixed effects and county specific 
linear trend. All column (2) also include an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if one was 17.75 or younger by the first quarter in the first year of 
land reform.
Mortality in 1 year Birth weight Low birthweight
First stage Reduced form
Mother completed high 
school Gestational age Prematurity Mortality in 1 month
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Table B.9: Heterogeneous effects of the school closures
below median above median below median above median
(1) (2) (1) (2)
0.004 -0.054*** -0.029*** -0.030***
[0.005] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008]
29367 31692 27716 29649
(0.11) (0.17) (0.096) (0.154)
-0.007 -0.011 -0.004 -0.011
[0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010]
29363 31684 27713 29642
0.005 0.001 0.0003 0.004
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]
29363 31684 27713 29642
-0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
27625 30704 26272 28536
0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002
[0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
27625 30704 26272 28536
-10.662 -10.647 -13.252 -8.201
[22.812] [18.932] [21.315] [20.002]
10299 12145 8276 12525
0.005 -0.011 -0.003 -0.005
[0.008] [0.007] [0.010] [0.007]
10299 12145 8276 12525
Pre-existing education level Population density in 1982
High school 
completion
Note: This table reports estimates of both the first stage and the reduced form estimates on infant 
health outcomes by various categories of counties. All column (1) report estimates in the sample of 
counties below the median of each category and all column (2) report estimates in counties above the 
median. All regressions include a linear cohort trend and its interaction with the indicator of at or 
younger than age 17.75 by the school closure, quarter of birth effects, county fixed effects and county 
specific linear trend.Robust standard errors clustered at county level are reported in brackets. The 
dependent variable mean of high school completion at age 18 is reported in parentheses. * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.        
The pre-existing education level is measured by the fraction of high school completion among pre-
exposure cohorts is calculated from mothers at age 18-23 by the first quarter in the first year of the 
school closure in the 1992 CCS. The median is 6.2 percent.
Population density is from the GIS data of 1982 Census. The median is 227 residents per square 
kilometers.
Gestational age
Prematurity
Mortality in 1 
month
Mortality in 1 
year
Birth weight
LBW
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Table B.10: Drought (time variant) and reform timing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
March-September March April May June
Drought in year t -0.011 -0.021*** -0.037*** -0.006 -0.004
[0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009]
Drought in year t-1 0.001 -0.026*** -0.027*** 0.004 -0.009
[0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
County FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
County linear trend X X X X X
Observations 7,306 7,306 7,306 7,306 7,306
R-squared 0.768 0.769 0.769 0.768 0.768
Dependent variable: first year of land reform (1978-1984)
Notes: The dependent variable is the first year of land reform, which is equal to 1 at the year reform started, 0 prior to 
the reform, and missing value after the first year. Drought is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the average 
monthly precipitation is below bottom 20th percentile in the precipitation distribution during 1957-1984 and 0 otherwise 
(precipitation data between 1965-1972 are unavailable). We include two drought indicators, one in the current year and 
another the year before. In the first column we measure drought using monthly average precipitation in the whole period 
between March and September, while each of the other column headings presents the single month in which drought is 
measured. All regressions include county fixed effects, year effects and county linear trends. The sample includes 1194 
counties and the time span is from 1975 to 1984. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.
Table B.11: Time-invariant determinants of reform timing
Obs R-squared
ln (grain output per capita 1976) 0.250** 481 0.011 0.399***
[0.121] [0.127]
ln (distance to province capital) 0.075** 1,201 0.003 0.004 -0.037
[0.036] [0.061] [0.039]
ln (labor force density 1976) -0.147*** 1,117 0.044 -0.173*** -0.150***
[0.022] [0.046] [0.028]
ln (famine intensity 1959-1961) -0.494*** 1,189 0.033 -0.289** -0.342***
[0.081] [0.144] [0.089]
ln (distance to beijing) -0.074* 1,201 0.003 -0.123 -0.130***
[0.038] [0.078] [0.041]
Observations 438 1,114
R-squared 0.095 0.070
Univariate Multivariate
Notes: The dependent variable is the first year of land reform, which varies from 1978 to 1984. For 
univariate analysis, each estimate is from a separate regression. Multivariate regression includes all 
dependent variables. Data on grain output per capita in 1976 are collected from county gazetteers, 
and only 438 counties report this information. Distance to beijing and distance to province capital city 
are in kilometers and are obtained from GIS map of 1982 Census. Labor force density in 1976 is 
calculated by population size aged 16-60 in 1976 divided by area. Using 1982 Census, we measure 
the 1959-61 famine intensity by the average cohort size born in 1953-1957 divided by the average 
cohort size born in 1959-1961. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. 
Dependent variable: first year of land reform (1978-1984)
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Table B.12: Land reform and grain output per capita
(1) (2)
1{1 year after reform or later} 0.032** 0.026*
[0.015] [0.015]
1{1 year after reform} 0.056*** 0.053***
[0.018] [0.018]
1{2 years after reform} 0.062** 0.055*
[0.031] [0.031]
1{3 years after reform} 0.102** 0.098**
[0.045] [0.045]
1{4 years after reform} 0.160** 0.161***
[0.063] [0.062]
1{5 years after reform} 0.155* 0.162**
[0.084] [0.083]
1{6 years after reform} 0.132 0.168
[0.127] [0.124]
County FE X X
Year FE X X
County linear trends X X
Initial control*Year FE X
Spring drought in t and t-1 X
Observations (panel A) 4,188 4,188
R-squared (panel A) 0.868 0.874
Observations (panel B) 4,188 4,188
R-squared (panel B) 0.869 0.875
Panel A: diff-in-diff estimate
Panel B: one estimate for each year after reform
Notes: This table reports estimates of reform on log grain output per capita. Panel A reports the 
difference-in-difference estimate. Panel B reports one estimate for each year after the reform 
within the difference-in-difference framework. Regression in column (1) includes county fixed 
effects, year effects and county linear time trends. Column (2) further includes determinants of 
reform timing interacted with time fixed effects and drought in March and Spring in year t and t-
1. The analysis sample includes 382 counties that report grain output data in 1974-1984 and 
that are matched with the data of control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in 
brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
dependent variable: ln(grain output per capita)
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Table B.13: Summary Statistics
Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs
Total score 500.07 1918244 499.35 724471 500.52 1193773
[94.72] [91.28] [96.74]
Math score 501.78 1908119 498.13 720391 503.99 1187728
[94.86] [92.23] [96.36]
Chinese score 496.27 1909643 502.35 722327 492.57 1187316
[97.97] [95.92] [99.01]
English score 495.86 1906641 513.78 721309 484.96 1185332
[95.81] [90.80] [97.12]
Percentile of total score 49.79 1918244 49.61 724471 50.04 1193773
[27.91] [27.3] [28.3]
Percentile of math score 50.29 1908119 49.28 720391 50.99 1187728
[28.08] [27.5] [28.4]
Percentile of Chinese score 48.86 1909643 50.78 722327 47.89 1187316
[28.52] [28.3] [28.6]
Percentile of English score 48.77 1906641 54.29 721309 45.66 1185332
[28.01] [27] [28.3]
admitted by any college 0.530 1918244 0.555 724471 0.514 1193773
[0.499] [0.497] [0.500]
admitted by a 4-year university 0.251 1918244 0.240 724471 0.258 1193773
[0.434] [0.427] [0.437]
admitted by a first-tier university 0.106 1918244 0.098 724471 0.110 1193773
[0.308] [0.298] [0.314]
admitted by a top 100 university 0.067 1918244 0.057 724471 0.073 1193773
[0.25] [0.231] [0.260]
admitted by an elite university 0.024 1918244 0.018 724471 0.028 1193773
[0.153] [0.133] [0.164]
in utero exposure to land reform 0.438 1918244 0.451 724471 0.429 1193773
[0.496] [0.498] [0.495]
All sample MaleFemale
Notes: standard deviations are reported in brackets. The sample includes test takers born between 1978 
and 1984 and who took the college entrance exams in 1999-2001.
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Table B.14: Effects of exposure to land reform on academic performance
Total Math Chinese English
Any 
college
Four-year 
college
First-tier 
college
Top 100 
college
Elite 
college
0.251* 0.308** 0.114 0.249* 0.002 0.002 0.003** 0.003*** 0.001
[0.140] [0.130] [0.132] [0.146] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
County FE X X X X X X X X X
YOB FE X X X X X X X X X
Year of exam FE X X X X X X X X X
County linear trends X X X X X X X X X
Initial control*YOB FE X X X X X X X X X
Spring drought in t and t-1 X X X X X X X X X
effect size relative to mean 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.028 0.045 0.042
dependent variable mean 49.79 50.29 48.86 48.77 0.53 0.251 0.106 0.067 0.024
Observations 1,918,244 1,908,119 1,909,643 1,906,641 1,918,244 1,918,244 1,918,244 1,918,244 1,918,244
R-squared 0.056 0.049 0.045 0.060 0.074 0.053 0.046 0.029 0.018
Test score in percentile
1{born 2 years after reform 
or later}
Admission outcomes
Notes: This table reports estimated effects of prenatal exposure to land reform on test scores and admission outcomes. Each 
estimate is from a separate regression on one outcome. The sample include test takers born in 1978 and 1984 and who took the 
college extrance exams in 1999-2001. All regressions include county fixed effects, year of birth effects, year of exam effects, 
county linear cohort trends, initial controls interacted with year of birth effects and drought in March and Spring in the current 
year and one year before. We also report the effect size of land reform on each outcome relative to the dependent variable 
mean. Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table B.15: Effects of exposure to land reform on academic performance,
by gender
Total Math Chinese English
Any 
college
Four-year 
college
First-tier 
college
Top 100 
college
Elite 
college
0.131 0.160 -0.016 0.209 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.0003
[0.178] [0.178] [0.179] [0.185] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
effect size relative to mean 0.003 0.003 0.0003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.010 0.035 0.017
dependent variable mean 49.61 48.28 50.78 54.29 0.555 0.240 0.098 0.057 0.018
0.348** 0.408*** 0.203 0.321** 0.003 0.003 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*
[0.157] [0.148] [0.145] [0.159] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
effect size relative to mean 0.007 0.008 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.012 0.045 0.055 0.071
dependent variable mean 50.04 51.00 47.89 45.66 0.514 0.258 0.110 0.073 0.028
County FE X X X X X X X X X
YOB FE X X X X X X X X X
Year of exam FE X X X X X X X X X
County linear trends X X X X X X X X X
Initial control*YOB FE X X X X X X X X X
Spring drought in t and t-1 X X X X X X X X X
Observations (female) 724,471 720,391 722,327 721,309 724,471 724,471 724,471 724,471 724,471
R-squared (female) 0.066 0.060 0.058 0.068 0.089 0.064 0.056 0.034 0.019
Observations (male) 1,193,773 1,187,728 1,187,316 1,185,332 1,193,773 1,193,773 1,193,773 1,193,773 1,193,773
R-squared (male) 0.055 0.048 0.046 0.062 0.069 0.051 0.045 0.030 0.021
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Panel A: Female
Panel B: Male
Test score in percentile
1{born 2 years after reform 
or later}
1{born 2 years after reform 
or later}
Admission outcomes
Notes: This table reports estimated effects of prenatal exposure to land reform on test scores and admission outcomes. Panel A reports 
estimates for female students and Panel B for male students. Each estimate is from a separate regression on one outcome. The sample 
include test takers born in 1978 and 1984 and who took the college extrance exams in 1999-2001. All regressions include county fixed 
effects, year of birth effects, year of exam effects, county linear cohort trends, initial controls interacted with year of birth effects and 
drought in March and Spring in the current year and one year before. We also report the effect size of land reform on each outcome 
relative to the dependent variable mean. Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in brackets.
Table B.16: Exposure to One Child Policy controlled for
1{2 years after land reform} 0.264* 0.264* 0.371 0.377 0.143 0.143 0.250 0.250
[0.158] [0.158] [1.853] [2.360] [0.151] [0.150] [0.162] [0.162]
1{1 year after OCP} 0.036 -0.054 0.137 0.038
[0.172] [0.201] [0.164] [0.181]
Observations 1,504,260 1,504,260 1,495,855 1,495,855 1,496,886 1,496,886 1,495,004 1,495,004
R-squared 0.056 0.056 0.048 0.048 0.045 0.045 0.060 0.060
1{2 years after land reform} 0.001 0.001 0.003* 0.003* 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.001** 0.001**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
1{1 year after OCP} 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
[0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Observations 1,504,260 1,504,260 1,504,260 1,504,260 1,504,260 1,504,260 1,504,260 1,504,260
R-squared 0.075 0.075 0.046 0.046 0.029 0.029 0.017 0.017
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in brackets. This table reports estimated effects of prenatal 
exposure to land reform and One Child Policy on test scores and admission outcomes. The sample include test takers born in 1978-
1984 and who took the college entrance exams in 1999-2001. All regressions include county fixed effects, year of birth effects, year 
of exam effects and county linear cohort trends. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Admission outcomes
Any college First-tier college Top 100 college Elite college
Test score in percentile
Total score Math Chinese English
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Table B.17: Exposure to One Child Policy controlled for, for boys
1{2 years after land reform} 0.361** 0.361** 0.444*** 0.445*** 0.197 0.197 0.339* 0.339*
[0.176] [0.176] [0.168] [0.168] [0.163] [0.163] [0.177] [0.177]
1{1 year after OCP} 0.001 -0.09 -0.054 0.072
[0.179] [0.172] [0.168] [0.185]
Observations 936276 936276 931263 931263 930760 930760 929347 929347
R-squared 0.056 0.056 0.048 0.048 0.045 0.045 0.062 0.062
1{2 years after land reform} 0.003 0.003 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.002** 0.002**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
1{1 year after OCP} 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0
[0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Observations 936276 936276 936276 936276 936276 936276 936276 936276
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.045 0.045 0.031 0.031 0.021 0.021
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in brackets. This table reports estimated 
effects of prenatal exposure to land reform and One Child Policy on test scores and admission outcomes for boys. The 
sample include test takers born in 1978-1984 and who took the college entrance exams in 1999-2001. All regressions 
include county fixed effects, year of birth effects, year of exam effects and county linear cohort trends. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Admission outcomes
Any college First-tier college Top 100 college Elite college
Test score in percentile
Total Math Chinese English
Table B.18: Exposure to One Child Policy controlled for, for girls
1{2 years after land reform} 0.138 0.138 0.135 0.135 0.089 0.091 0.167 0.167
[0.204] [0.204] [0.202] [0.202] [0.205] [0.204] [0.207] [0.207]
1{1 year after OCP} 0.038 -0.041 0.465* 0.003
[0.250] [0.253] [0.249] [0.254]
Observations 567,984 567,984 564,592 564,592 566,126 566,126 565,657 565,657
R-squared 0.066 0.066 0.060 0.060 0.058 0.058 0.067 0.067
1{2 years after land reform} -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
[0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
1{1 year after OCP} 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
[0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
Observations 567,984 567,984 567,984 567,984 567,984 567,984 567,984 567,984
R-squared 0.088 0.088 0.055 0.055 0.034 0.033 0.018 0.018
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in brackets. This table reports estimated 
effects of prenatal exposure to land reform and One Child Policy on test scores and admission outcomes for girls. The 
sample include test takers born in 1978-1984 and who took the college entrance exams in 1999-2001. All regressions 
include county fixed effects, year of birth effects, year of exam effects and county linear cohort trends.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Test score in percentile
Total score Math Chinese English
Admission outcomes
Any college First-tier college Top 100 college Elite college
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Table B.19: Test sample selection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
number of 
births
ever went to 
high school=1
high school 
dropout=1
 college 
applicant=1 test taker=1 male=1
age at the 
exams
-0.561 0.005 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.0017 0.001 -0.005
[0.823] [0.003] [0.003] [0.009] [0.0013] [0.003] [0.009]
County FE X X X X X X X
YOB FE X X X X X X X
County linear trends X X X X X X X
Initial control*YOB FE X X X X X X X
Spring drought in t and t-1 X X X X X X X
Year of exam FE X X
dependent variable mean 86 0.15 0.02 0.39 0.968 0.52 19.09
Observations 7,217 422,076 59,607 6,832 1,980,665 621,265 1,918,244
R-squared 0.968 0.074 0.062 0.784 0.052 0.004 0.775
1{born 2 years after reform or later}
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Notes: Column (1) reports the estimated effect of land reform on the number of births at the county-birth year level using 1990 Census. Using 2000 
Census, column (2) reports the estimate on whether one ever went to high school or still in high school, column (3) report the estimate on high school 
dropout in the sample of individuals who went to high school. Column (4) report the estimate on the fraction of college applicants in high school students 
at the county-birth year-year of application level. Column (5) reports the estimate on whether an applicant had taken the national exam using the 
administrative data on test scores. Column (6) reports the estimated effect on gender at the individual level using 1990 Census. Column (7) reports the 
estimate on one's age at college entrance exam using the administrative data on test scores.The sample includes individuals born in 1978-1984 in 
counties matched with the county-level data on the reform timing as well as all county-level controls. Regressions in column (1)-(3) and (6)-(7) include 
county fixed effects, year of birth effects, county linear cohort trends, initial controls interacted with year of birth effects and drought in March and Spring 
in the current year and one year before. Column (4)-(5) further control for year of exam effects. In column (1), robust standard errors are reported in 
brackets; in column (2)-(7), robust standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in brackets.
Table B.20: Land reform and grain output
(1) (2) (3)
full sample
Change in grain output 
above median
Change in grain output 
below median
1{1 year after reform or later} 0.026* 0.092*** -0.039*
[0.015] [0.019] [0.021]
County FE X X X
Year FE X X X
Initial control*Year FE X X X
Spring drought in t and t-1 X X X
County linear trends X X X
Observations 4,188 2,093 2,095
R-squared 0.874 0.905 0.818
Dependent variable: ln(grain output per capita)
Notes: This table reports estimates of reform on log grain output per capita. Column (1) reports the estimate 
using the full sample, column (2) a subsample of counties above median of the change in grain output in 
capita before and after the reform, and column (3) a subsamle of counties below median. All regressions 
control for county fixed effects, year effects, county linear time trends, determinants of reform timing 
interacted with time fixed effects and droughts in March and April in year t and t-1. The analysis sample 
includes 382 counties that report grain output data in 1974-1984 and that are matched with the data of 
control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table B.21: Summary Statistics
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Table B.22: Land reform, male birth and sex ratio
Sex ratio
(1) (2) (3)
First child Second child Second child
Post 0.003 -0.010* -0.021
[0.004] [0.006] [0.044]
Girl first 0.027*** 0.136***
[0.003] [0.020]
Post*Girl first 0.029*** 0.151***
[0.004] [0.030]
County FE X X X
YOB FE X X X
Initial control*YOB FE X X X
Spring drought in t and t-1 X X X
County linear trends X X X
Dependent variable mean 0.511 0.523 1.27
Observations 371762 279069 24,255
R-squared 0.006 0.011 0.131
Male=1
Notes: Column 1 reports estimate for the effect of exposure to land reform on the probability of 
first child being male; column 2 for the effect on second child being male; column 3 for sex ratio 
of second births by county and year. The sample includes individuals born between 1974 and 
1986 in counties that are matched with the county-level data on reform timing and initial controls. 
All regressions include county fixed effects, year of birth effects, county linear trends, initial 
county controls interacted with birth year effects and droughts in March and April of the current 
year and the year before. Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in 
brackets.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table B.23: Treatment heterogeneity, by changes in grain output
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample
Change in grain output 
above median
Change in grain output 
below median
Post -0.015 -0.029*** 0.003
[0.010] [0.013] [0.017]
Girl first 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.033***
[0.005] [0.007] [0.008]
Post*Girl first 0.013* 0.027*** -0.004
[0.007] [0.009] [0.010]
Dependent variable mean 0.521 0.524 0.519
Observations 93335 53243 40092
R-squared 0.011 0.011 0.013
Dependent variable: Male=1
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Notes: Column 1 reports estimate for the effect of exposure to land reform on the probability of second child 
being male in the full sample; column 2 for the effect in counties above the median of change in grain output 
before and after the reform; column 3 for the effect in counties below the median. The sample includes 
individuals born between 1974 and 1986 in 400 counties that are matched with the county-level data on 
reform timing and grain output. All regressions include county fixed effects, year of birth effects, county linear 
trends, initial county controls interacted with birth year effects and droughts in March and April of the current 
year and the year before. Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in brackets.
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Table B.24: Treatment heterogeneity, by the fraction of women growing
cash crops
Dependent variable: 
Male=1
Post*Girl first*% Women -0.0002
[0.0002]
Post*Girl first 0.039***
[0.011]
Post -0.02
[0.013]
Girl first 0.02**
[0.008]
Observations 256605
R-squared 0.011
This table reports estimate for the effect of exposure to land reform on 
the probability of second child being male by the county-level fraction 
of women growing cash crops. The sample includes individuals born 
between 1974 and 1986 in counties that are matched with the county-
level data on reform timing and initial controls. The regression includes 
county fixed effects, year of birth effects, county linear trends, initial 
county controls interacted with birth year effects and droughts in March 
and April of the current year and the year before. Robust standard 
errors clustered at the county level are reported in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Notes: Post*% Women and Girl first*% Women are also controlled for.
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Table B.25: Treatment heterogeneity, by parental education
(1) (2) (3)
A. Mother
Post*Girl first*High school 0.065***
[0.024]
Post*Girl first*Middle school 0.035***
[0.011]
Post*Girl first*Primary school 0.020**
[0.008]
Post*Girl first 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.017***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.006]
Observations 260529 260529 260529
R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.012
B. Father
Post*Girl first*High school 0.033**
[0.014]
Post*Girl first*Middle school 0.016*
[0.009]
Post*Girl first*Primary school 0.014
[0.010]
Post*Girl first 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.016*
[0.004] [0.005] [0.009]
Observations 260529 260529 260529
R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.012
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Dependent variable: Male=1
This table reports estimate for the effect of exposure to land reform on the probability of 
second child being male by parental education. The sample includes individuals born 
between 1974 and 1986 in counties that are matched with the county-level data on 
reform timing and initial controls. All regressions include county fixed effects, year of birth 
effects, county linear trends, initial county controls interacted with birth year effects and 
droughts in March and April of the current year and the year before. Robust standard 
errors clustered at the county level are reported in brackets.
Note: Post*Parental eduation, Girs first*Parental education and Parental education are 
also controlled for.
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Table B.26: Land reform, OCP and sex ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Land reform 0.005 0.005
[0.005] [0.005]
OCP -0.003 -0.002
[0.005] [0.005]
Observations 298310 298310 298310
R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.006
Land reform*Girl first 0.030*** 0.031***
[0.005] [0.008]
Land reform -0.012* -0.013*
[0.007] [0.007]
OCP*Girl first 0.024*** -0.002
[0.004] [0.008]
OCP -0.017*** -0.004
[0.006] [0.007]
Girl first 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.025***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Observations 224600 224600 224600
R-squared 0.011 0.011 0.011
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Male=1
Panel B: Second Child
Panel A: First Child
Notes: The sample includes individuals born between 1974 and 1986 in 
counties that are matched with the county-level data on timing of land 
reform and OCP. All regressions include county fixed effects, year of birth 
effects, county linear trends, initial county controls interacted with birth 
year effects and droughts in March and April of the current year and the 
year before. Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are 
reported in brackets.
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Table B.27: Land reform, OCP and fertility
Land reform 2.333** 2.277**
[1.101] [1.104]
OCP -2.824** -2.783**
[1.101] [1.097]
Dependent variable mean
Observations 11137 11137 11137
R-squared 0.948 0.948 0.949
Land reform*Girl first 0.026*** -0.009
[0.004] [0.008]
Land reform -0.016*** 0.001
[0.005] [0.006]
OCP*Girl first 0.038*** 0.046***
[0.004] [0.009]
OCP -0.023*** -0.027***
[0.004] [0.006]
Girl first 0.040*** 0.030*** 0.031***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
Dependent variable mean
Observations 298310 298310 298310
R-squared 0.343 0.343 0.343
B. Have second child=1
A. County-by-year number of birth
90
137
